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CHAP`l'hR I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Although explosives have their origin in 
Chinese fireworks, known to have been in 
existence for over 2,000 years, their useful 
properties were not exploited in the winning of 
minerals underground until the beginning of the 
seventeenth century. The earliest reference 
to their use occurs in the proceedings of the 
Schemnitz Mine Tribunal for 1627, which include 
a report of a demonstration of blasting given in 
a Hungarian mine. However, such was the 
convenience of even the early types of explosive 
that their use spread rapidly, and by 1689 
gunpowder was in use in Cornish tin mines. 
All the early types of explosives were 
variations of gunpowder with three essential 
constituents - charcoal, sulphur and potassium 
chlorate - providing respectively the fuel, the 
means of easy ignition and the oxygen required for 
the combustion of the charcoal and the sulphur. 
Although no records exist, it is certain that 
many accidents would be caused both by the 
primitive nature of the explosives and carelessnes 
on the part of the men engaged on shotfiring 
operations. 
Immediately, therefore, in the study of 
shotfiring accidents a differentiation must be 
made between those caused by failure of the human 
element and those caused by the failure of the 
explosive or ancillary equipment to attain technical 
perfection. The Chief Inspector of Explosives 
2. 
in his annual report sub- divides shotfiring 
accidents occurring in mines and quarries into 
sixteen categories: 
Prematures and failure to get away from 
the shothole 
Firing while persons are at shothole 
Projected debris 
Returning too soon, hang fires 
Tampering with misfires 
Ramming and stemming 
Sparks, flames etc. 
Boring into unexploded charges 
Striking unexploded charges in removing debris 
Detonator accidents (a) Preparing charges 
(b) Detonator accidents 
other than above 
Lighting fuse before inserting charge 
Fumes 
Hot or unexploded residue left in socket 
Various (i) 
Details of ignitions of gas following shot - 
:firing and accidents resulting from such 
ignitions are given in a separate section of the 
report. 
Before differentiating this classification 
into two main categories, it is first essential 
to decide the requirements of a perfect 
explosive, detonator and exploder. An explosive 
will ideally 
(a) Be incapable of igniting methane or coal 
dust under any conditions. 
(b) Always detonate completely when correctly 
initiated and never under any other 
circumstances. 
(c) Not produce toxic fumes. 
Similarly a detonator should 
(a)/ 
(a) Always fire on the application of the 
correct firing current, or when the fuse 
has burned down and in no other 
circumstances. 
(b) Be incapable of igniting methane or coal 
dust under any conditions, 
and an exploder should 
(a) Always fire the detonator or detonators 
when correctly used. 
(b) Be incapable of igniting methane or coal 
dust. 
These requirements are not at present all 
attained. 
Considering the division further, it is 
clear that in the category containing accidents 
caused by the failure of the explosive and other 
equipment to attain perfection we must include: 
(1) Accidents resulting from ignitions of 
methane and/or coal dust by explosives, 
detonators or exploders. 
(2) Prematures 
(3) Ramming and stemming 
(.) Sparks, flames etc. 
(5) Boring into unexploded charges 
(6) Striking unexploded charges in removing 
debris 
(7) Detonator accidents 
(8) Fumes 
(9) Hot or unexploded residue left in socket. 
Similarly, accidents caused by errors of 
judgement will include the following sub-divisions: 
(1) Firing while persons are at hole 
(2) Failure to take proper cover 
(3) Projected debris 
(4) Returning too soon. 
Accidents caused by tampering with misfires 
are included in the second category as the major 
contributing/ 
TABLE I 
Numbers Killed and InJured hy Accidents Resulting from the Use 
and handling of Explosives in n Mines and 9uarries 1932 - 1956 


























































1932 105 10 2 6 28 18 10 6 32 10 1 8 7 2 26 151 94 26 271 56 35 9 
33 97 3 5 4 12 7 17 4 23 12 o 14 4 7 18 121 88 18 227 53 39 8 
3)4 9)4 12 6 2 24 33 17 8 27 10 10 15 6 5 8 138 131 8 277 50 14.7 3 
1935 130 17 1 13 23 1 13 10 25 27 5 8 5 1 10 184 95 10 289 64 33 3 
36 113 20 3 1 15 2 18 11 21 18 6 11 2 1 18 152 90 18 260 58 35 7 
37 138 10 1 7 35 o 20 6 26 11 4 15 6 2 19 191 90 19 300 64 30 6 
38 152 22 0 5 24 9 13 12 22 22 7 7 9 5 25 203 106 25 334 61 32 
1 
7 
39 148 22 1 6 30 78 18 11 18 ii 1 m il 3 2 22 207 462 22 391 53 4 f z 
1940 124 23 2 1 34 0 14 8 18 17 6 11 5 2 12 184 81 12 277 66 29 5 
41 169 10 3 2 27 2 10 2 12 10 1 13 8 4 11 211 62 11 284 74 22 4 
42 182 11 1 1 33 15 12 9 4 11 3 21 3 1 12 228 79 12 319 71 25 4 
43 176 18 0 1 23 8 20 6 12 4 2 19 2 1 4 218 74 4 296 74 25 1 
44 215 15 3 0 24 32 15 1 3 3 o 1 2 257% 69 12 338 76 ' 20 4 
1945 199 12 3 2 15 9 10 0 6 5 1 11 2 2 6 231 46 6 283 82 16 1 2 
46 214 23 1 4 23 4 9 2 6 8 2 16 3 3 7 265 53 7 325 82 16 2 
47 244 21 1 1 27 130 4 5 6 5 1 12 4 1 2 294 168 2 464 63 36 1 
48 274 25 8 7 19 o 11 8 0 13 0 18 4 1 13 333 55 13 401 83 14 3 
49 266 21 20 3 28 0 39 3 0 0 15 2 1 11 338 64 11 41.E 82 15 3 
1950 241 19 26 2 10 5 i 2 2 2 5 1 10 9 2 14 299 48 14 361 83 13 4 
51 214 13 34 2 12 4 6 2 0 11 3 8 0 1 8 275 35 8 318 85 11 4 
52 246 36 17 4 8 o 14 3 2 7 3 9 1 0 13 311 39 13 363 86 11 3 
53 248 36 14 2 4 8 8 4 0 7 4 11 0 5 10 304 47 10 361 84 13 3 
54 222 27 5 0 1 o 13 o o 12 o 6 o 2 11 255 33 11 299 86 10 4 
1955 220 27 13 0 2 0 7 5 0 3 7 7 0 0 5 262 29 5 296 88 10 2 
56 228 23 1 2 0 4 18 2 0 
14 0 7 0 0 0 254 35 0 289 88 12 0 
GRAPH 
NUMBERS KILLED AND INJURED IN USE AND HANDLING OF 
EXPLOSIVES IN MINES AND QUARRIES [1932-19563 IN ACCIDENTS: - 
(A) CAUSED BY FAILURE OF HUMAN ELEMENT 
[B] CAUSED BY FAILURE OF EXPLOSIVE OR ANCILLARY 
EQUIPMENT TO ATTAIN PERFECTION 
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GRAPH I I 
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contributing factor is gross carelessness on the 
part of the men engaged on the job. Accidents 
under the heading 'Lighting fuse before 
inserting charge' are included in the 'unclassifie 
group, as this practice has resulted in a 
negligible number of injuries over the period 
1932 - 1956. 
In Table I the figures recorded refer to 
the number of people killed and injured in mines 
and quarries. Unfortunately a similar sub - 
divison is not available for mines alone, either 
from the reports of the Inspectors of Mines or 
from the Ministry of Power. 
Examination of the Table, and Graph I 
plotted from the Table, shows that the numbers 
killed and injured due to failure of the human 
element form a large and increasing proportion 
of the total. This becomes even more obvious 
when the figures are plotted as percentages on 
Graph II. This will occur if advances in 
explosives technology are not accompanied by a 
corresponding improvement in care in the use and 
handling of explosives. Much effort has been 
expended in the development of safer blasting 
equipment as any ignition of methane or coal 
dust can be the beginning of a disastrous major 
explosion. Ignition of firedamp by explosives 
was the initial cause of two recent disasters 
at Valleyfield Colliery, Fife in 1939 and the 





the subject is amenable to laboratory 
investigations under controlled conditions, 
enabling the results obtained to be easily 
analysed. 
On the other hand, accidents caused by 
errors of judgement or carelessness seldom kill 
or injure more than one or two people at a time, 
and are not at all amenable to laboratory 
investigations. Nevertheless, as this class 
now accounts for approximately 86% of the annual 
total, there seems good reason for revision of 
thought on the problem. Over the years 1933 -57, 
only one paper published in the Transactions 
of the Institution of Mining Engineers dealt with 
the problem of shotfiring accidents caused by 
failure of the human element, compared with 
nineteen which brought advances in blasting 
technology to the notice of the Institute 
members (ii, iii). The main part of this work 
is therefore concentrated on examining shotfiring 
practices and methods, and determining the reasons 
for the carelessness and weaknesses in the methods 
employed which result in shotfiring accidents. 
It is, however, considered essential to review 
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CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MINING EXPLOSIVES 
11. 
All the early explosives were derivatives 
of gunpowder and were thus non -detonating and 
comparatively slow burning. Although 
satisfactory for metal mining work, such 
explosives were very dangerous in the presence 
of inflammable or explosive atmospheres, as any 
ignition which occurred could give rise to a 
disastrous coal dust explosion which could 
sweep through the entire colliery workings. 
Although gunpowder and its derivatives were 
the only commercial explosives available up to 
the middle of the 19th century, other substances 
had been discovered which were to assume an 
increasingly important role in blasting work. 
Howard in 1799 produced fulminate of mercury and 
this was used as a detonating agent in firearms 
by 1814. Pelouze in 1838 initiated the study 
of nitrocelluloses by treating cotton with 
strong nitric acid. Schonbein and Sobrero 
employed the dehydrating and nitrating action of 
sulphuric and nitric acids to produce guncotton 
and nitroglycerine from cotton and glycerine. 
These substances, requiring a sudden shock or blow 
to make them explode, opened out new possibilities 
for blasting work. However, little notice was 
taken of them until 1859 when Alfred Nobel and 
his father began a serious study of their 
manufacture, and not until 1863 was nitroglycerine 
prepared and used commercially. Pure nitro- 
:glycerine is an oily liquid freezing at 13 °C. 
and/ 
12, 
and is, especially in the frozen state, 
extremely sensitive to shock of any kind. It 
is thus unsuited for use in minesand to 
minimise the inherent danger Nobel experimented 
and found that a mixture of 75% nitroglycerine 
f 
and 25% kieselguhr was comparatively safe and 
easy to handle or form into cartridges. This 
mixture, Dynamite, soon became an established 
blasting agent and is still used in certain 
metalliferous mines abroad. Because of the 
high toxicity of the fumes produced on 
detonation it is not,however, suitable for 
general use underground. 
In 1875 Nobel discovered that the mixture 
of 8% of guncotton and 92% nitroglycerine was at 
once easily formed into cartridges and waterproof. 
This explosive, Blasting Gelatine, is still the 
most powerful commercially available and is used 
as a standard by which to measure the strengths 
of coal mining and other explosives. To 
reduce the strength of this explosive for 
certain applications, Nobel lowered the nitro - 
:glycerine content, added woodmeal and corrected 
the resultant oxygen deficiency by adding 
potassium nitrate. This mixture was called 
Gelatine Dynamite. In 1879 Nobel took out a 
patent for a similar mixture containing 
ammonium nitrate in place of the potassium 
nitrate and thus introduced a new extremely 




Nitroglycerine and explosives containing 
nitroglycerine are extremely sensitive to shock 
in the frozen state and many accidents were 
caused by people handling or attempting to thaw 
out explosives. Although a patent was taken 
out in 1866 for a method of lowering the 
freezing point of nitroglycerine, low freezing 
nitroglycerine preparations did not appear on 
the British Permitted List until 1925 and were 
not made compulsory till 1933. The most 
suitable substance for lowering the freezing 
point of nitroglycerine is nitroglycol which 
exhibits comparable explosive qualities but 
freezes at -22 °C. When 20% of glycol and 80% 
of glycerine are mixed and the mixture nitrated, 
the resultant combination will not freeze at any 
winter temperatures experienced in this country. 
Although other compounds, generally the 
products of nitration of organic substances 
such as benzene and toluene, have been used in 
mining explosives they have never achieved 
importance comparable with nitroglycerine and 
ammonium nitrate and their derivatives 
Early Experimental work on the ignition of 
Methane and Coal Dust by Explosives 
The dangers of coal dust and the influence 
of coal dust on mine explosions was realised 
early in this country and the views of Bald (i) 
were supported by Buddle, who investigated the 
Wallsend/ 
14. 
Wallsend explosion in 1830 (ii). It was not 
universally held that coal dust was an important 
factor and the Coal Mines Regulation Act of 
1872, containing regulations governing the use 
of 'gunpowder or other explosive or inflammable 
substance' underground,did not detail any 
precautions to be taken against coal dust. 
An early attempt to ensure safety with the 
dangerous explosives of the day was the develop- 
ment of the water cartridge, patented in 1876 
by Captain McNab. This consisted of a paper 
bag filled with water in which the explosive 
was detonated, and although tin containers 
later provided a more reliable and stronger 
vehicle for the water, the inconvenience in 
their use resulted in a comparatively early 
demise in spite of the undoubted safety 
advantages gained. 
In 1875, Galloway proved conclusively 
that coal dust alone or with methane could 
produce violent explosions when initiated by 
an intense igniting source. As a result of 
several disastrous explosions in this country 
and abroad, Commissions were set up to examine 
the problem and as explosives were an obvious 
and ready means of ignition it became clear 
that shotfiring must be subjected to a searching 
examination. The first of these Commissions - 
Le Commission du Grisou - was set up in France 
in 1877 to determine if by modifying the nature, 
method/ 
15. 
method and use of explosives, explosions from 
this cause could be diminished. The committee 
concluded in 1880 that, as the ignition of methane 
occurred between 600 °C. and 700 °C., and no 
explosive existed which exploded at a lower 
temperature, it would be difficult to prevent 
entirely the ignition of methane by shotfiring. 
In Britain a Royal Commission on Accidents 
in Mines was appointed in 18 ?9 and reported in 
1886 that the following facts were conclusively 
established. 
(1) "The occurrence of a blown -out shot in 
working places where inflammable dust exists in 
great abúndance may, even in the total absence 
of firedamp, give rise to violent explosions 
or at any rate be followed by the propagation 
of flame through considerable areas. 
(2) "The occurrence of a blown -out shot where 
only small percentages of firedamp exist in the 
presence of comparatively slightly inflammable 
or even non -inflammable but very fine dry 
dusts may give rise to an explosion." 
As a result of experiments with various 
types of explosives the Commission concluded 
that: 
(1) "The employment of nitroglycerine or 
guncotton preparations in conjunction with the 
water cartridge secures safety against 
explosions even by a blown -out shot where the 
air may contain a highly inflammable dust 
suspended/ 
16. 
suspended when the shot is fired. 
(2) "The employment of the above types of 
explosive in conjunction with porous tamping 
soaked with water ensures safety in the above 
circumstances and also if the shot blows out 
into a highly inflammable mixture of firedamp 
and air. 
(3) "Neither the water cartridge nor porous 
tamping afford protection against explosions of 
coal dust or firedamp when employed with 
powder explosives." (iii) 
The Development of the British Gallery Test 
The conclusions of the Royal Commission on 
Accidents in Mines were embodied in the Coal 
Mines Regulation Act of 1887 which stated that 
where gas was present or where the place was dry 
and dusty no shot should be fired "unless the 
explosive . . . is so used with water or other 
contrivance as to prevent it enflaming gas, or 
is of such a nature that it cannot enflame gas ". 
When this Act came into force in January, 1888, 
many so- called flameless explosives were 
manufactured, and as tests by makers and users 
generally gave contradictory results, those 
responsible for safety in mines were left in a 
state of doubt. Accordingly, a committee was 
appointed by the North of England Institute of 
Mining and Mechanical Engineers to investigate 
and report on the safety of explosives. The 
test/ 
17. 
test employed was designed to simulate the 
conditions of a blown -out shot, with the 
explosive doing no work and firing into an 
inflammable and explosive atmosphere. The 
gallery was 3 feet in diameter and 101 feet long, 
and the explosive, contained in a cannon 422 
inches long with a bore of 18 inches, fired into 
an explosion chamber 222 feet long formed off by 
a paper seal from the rest of the gallery. A 
series of tests established that high explosives, 
although producing evident flame on detonation, 
were much less dangerous and less liable to 
ignite inflammable mixtures of air and methane 
and/or coal dust than blackpowder. 
Parallel work, carried out at the same time 
for a Royal Commission on Explosions from Coal 
Dust, confirmed these results and the Coal Mines 
Regulation Act of 1896 conferred on the 
Secretary of State powers to propose, modify 
and amend rules on such subjects as the use and 
storage of explosives at mines. A special 
provision (Section 5) empowered him to prohibit 
by order the use of any explosive likely to be or 
become dangerous in any mine, and, by virtue of 
these powers a series of Explosives in Coal Mines 
Orders was issued prescribing the nature and 
manner of use of explosives to be employed in 
coal mines. 
To provide a basis for differentiating 
between explosives a committee (iv) appointed in 
1896/ 
18. 
1896 " to enquire into the best tests to 
determine the safety of explosives . . . and 
the means of applying such tests ", recommended 
the erection of a testing station. This 
suggestion was adopted and a station opened for 
official work at Woolwich in June 1897. The 
first official gallery differed only in 
dimensions from that erected at Hebburn by the 
North of England Institute of Mining and 
Mechanical Engineers. The test consisted of 
firing 40 shots of explosive, each well stemmed 
with dry clay and equivalent to 2 oz. of 75% 
dynamite or 6 oz. of R.F.G. 2 gunpowder for high 
explosives or powders respectively, into a 10% 
coal gas /air mixture. If, after 20, 30 and 40 
shots had been fired, and no ignition or not 
more than one or two ignitions respectively had 
occurred, the explosive was considered to have 
passed. In 1899 a more stringent supplementary 
test with heavier charges and a 15% coal gas /air 
mixture was introduced and in 1901 the original 
permitted list was withdrawn and only those 
explosives passing the more severe test were 
allowed in mines governed by the Explosives in 
Coal Mines Orders. 
In 1907 a Departmental Committee on Bobbinite 
concluded that the existing standard was not 
sufficiently high, and this report was endorsed 
by a Royal Commission on Mines in its second 
report dated July 1909. A new experimental 
station/ 
19. 
station was opened at Rotherham in 1911 and, 
after initial work on explosives already on the 
Permitted List, official testing was started in 
July 1911. By March 1914 only those explosives 
passing the Rotherham test were allowed on the 
new Permitted List, The new gallery was 50 feet 
long, 5 feet in diameter with an explosion 
chamber 18 feet long, and the cannon had a bore 
of 2.17 inches and was L.7 inches long. The 
test consisted of finding the maximum charge 
which when fired untamped into a coal gas /air 
atmosphere did not cause ignition to five 
successive shots. This charge was also tested 
with coal dust /air mixtures and again no 
ignitions in five successive shots were required. 
In 1921, because of difficulties in obtaining 
standard test conditions due to variations in 
coal gas composition, testing was transferred to 
an identical station at Ardeer, erected for 
experimental work by the Nobel Division of 
Imperial Chemical Industries. The test remained 
unchanged but work carried out at Ardeer, 
Eskmeals, Rotherham and Buxton culminated in the 
introduction of a modified test in 1929, 
coinciding with the transference of official 
testing to Buxton. The new test, which has 
remained unchanged for unsheathed permitted 
explosives, consisted of: 
(1) Firing into a 9% methane /air mixture 
(a) Five shots of 8 oz. unstemmed 
(b)/ 
20. 
(b) Five shots of 28 oz. stemmed with 
one clay plug. 
(2) Firing into a coal dust suspension 
(a) Five shots of 28 oz. stemmed with 
one clay plug. 
For explosives with a density of less than 0.75 
gms. /cc., the charge used in the stemmed shots 
is reduced to 18 oz. All shots are directly 
initiated, i.e. with detonator nearest the 
muzzle of the cannon. 
The Development of Sheathed and Equivalent to 
Sheathed Explosives 
Manufacturers were well able to produce 
explosives satisfying official requirements by 
reducing the nitroglycerine content and adding 
inert substances. Abroad work was concentrated 
on the development of even safer explosives, 
culminating in the successful development and 
production of sheathed explosives in 1913. 
Although the discovery is popularly attributed 
to Lemaire, Jikinski in 1888 had used sand or 
kieselguhr saturated with water as a sheathing 
material and in 1898 an explosive 'Elephant 
Brand Gunpowder' was authorised by the Home 
Office provided that the cartridge was 
surrounded by a layer of sodium bicarbonate and 
separated from it by a suitable diaphragm. It 
was however due to the work of Watteyne and 
Lemaire that sheathed explosives became 
commercially practicable. It is interesting to 
note/ 
21 . 
note that they arrived at the final solution 
after research with external tamping - incom- 
:bustible dust placed in front of the shothole - 
so placed that the blast raised a cloud of 
particles inhibiting ignition of gas or coal 
dust. These experiments were so successful that 
they led logically to the attachment of the 
incombustible material to the explosive in a tube 
around the charge. After experimenting with many 
substances Watteyne and Lemairefinally chose a 
mixture of sodium chloride and calcium fluoride 
as offering the best compromise between cost and 
efficiency. In 1920 Belgian regulations 
permitted sheathed explosives as an alternative 
to external tamping subject to certain conditions 
regarding diameters of charge and sheath, and 
methods of manufacture. (v) 
Introduction of sheathed explosives to 
Britain was delayed until 1934 when Naylor and 
Wheeler demonstrated the greatly enhanced safety 
obtained by their use. The explosive used in 
their tests, carried out for the Explosives in 
Mines Research Committee of the Safety in Mines 
Research Board, had a composition of nitroglycerine 
12.5 %, ammonium nitrate 75% and woodmeal 12.5 %, 
and the smallest weights causing ignition when 
fired freely suspended in a 9% methane /air 
mixture were found. Unsheathed, ignitions were 
caused by charges of less than two ounces, but 
sheaths of sodium bicarbonate and sodium 
hyposulphite/ 
hyposulphite allowed 10 oz. to be fired safely 
and iron filings allowed 12 oz. to be fired. (vi) 
Further tests showed that sodium bicarbonate 
gave similar protection to all permitted 
explosives and, as manufacturing difficulties were 
overcome, sheathed explosives were brought into 
commercial production and remained unchanged until 
1949. Then the Nobel Division of I.C.I. Ltd. 
introduced a felt sheath containing 85% of sodium 
bicarbonate and 15% cellulose fibre. This was 
wrapped round the charge and glued in position, 
overcoming one of the great disadvantages of powder 
sheaths - liability to damage and consequent 
reduction in safety factor. Shepherd and Grimshaw 
(vii) found that one type of permitted explosive, 
which caused ignition of a 9% methane/air mixture 
with charges of over 2 oz. fired freely suspended, 
had the limiting weight increased to 8 oz. when 
uniformly sheathed with 3/32 inch of sodium 
bicarbonate. 
FIGURE I - SHEATHED EXPLOSIVE 
A- Normal 13- Wtii explosive explosive 
de forme.ci displace d late-rally 
23. 
If however the explosive cartridge was deformed 
into an ellipse with a major axis 1 7/16 in. 
diameter (Figure i) or displaced laterally so 
that the sheathing was nil on one side and 3/16 
in. on the other, the limiting charge was reduced 
to 4 oz. Felt sheathing, although largely 
removing the possibility of accidental damage, 
does not preclude intentional removal of the 
sheath by uninformed workmen. 
It was felt that if the sheathing material 
could be incorporated in the explosive enhanced 
safety would result. Sodium bicarbonate is not, 
however, suitable for incorporation into ammonium 
nitrate explosives as these two compounds react 
with the evolution of ammonia. Common salt, 
sodium chloride, can however be included and is 
of comparable efficiency with sodium bicarbonate 
when used as a sheath. Due to its hygroscopic 
nature it cannot be used in this way. As early 
as 1910 work was carried out in Belgium to 
determine the influence of the size of the 
gallery on testing and one of the explosives used 
was a heavily salted mixture containing 25% of 
sodium chloride (viii). Tests carried out by 
Imperial Chemical Industries showed that the 
same degree of safety, as measured by the 
suspended cartridge test, was imparted to an 
explosive if 30% by weight of sodium chloride was 
used as a sheath or incorporated in the explosive. 
This discovery led to the development, and in 
1950/ 
214.. 
1950,the marketing of a new range of explosives 
designated Equivalent to Sheathed, generally 
contracted to Eq. S. To aid the attainment 
of a minimum standard for Sheathed and Eq. S. 
explosives a new test was formulated and came 
into effect in 1953. This consisted of: 
(1) Firing into a 9% methane /air mixture 
(a) 5 shots of 20 oz., including weight 
of sheath, inversely initiated, 
without stemming. 
(b) 5 shots of 28 oz., excluding and without 
sheath, directly initiated, with 
1 in. clay plug. 
(2) Firing into a coal dust /air mixture 
(a) 5 shots of 20 oz., including weight 
of sheath, inversely initiated. 
For explosives with a density less than 0.75 gms./ 
c.c., the charge in test (1) (b) is reduced to 
18 oz. 
Other Testing Procedures 
The first test at Hebburn, and the present 
official testing procedure, were both designed 
to simulate the condition of a shot doing no 
work and blowing out directly into the most 
dangerous atmosphere possible underground. As 
a deplorable standard of practice would be 
required before 28 oz. of explosive would be 
fired with one inch of stemming, or any shot 
without any stemming whatever, it soom became 
evident that the official test was not in fact 
reproducing/ 
25. 
reproducing the conditions under which ignitions 
were occurring in the field. Following the 
introduction to this country of sheathed 
explosives in 1933, Naylor and Wheeler developed 
the suspended cartridge test (ix) in order to 
have available a sensitive criterion for the 
differentiation of permitted explosives, some of 
which gave ignitions with charges of only 2 oz. 
It seemed unlikely that such conditions could 
occur in practice but Grimshaw (x) after 
investigating many cases of ignition of methane 
following shotfiring, in the main when sheathed 
explosives were being used, concluded that in 
the majority of cases part of the explosive charge 
had been crossed by a break or fissure in the 
strata and would therefore be in direct contact 
with the atmosphere in the break. 
Experimenting with charges partially 
confined in a very short hole he found that any 
given charge was more likely to produce ignitions 
under these conditions than when fired wholly 
confined or wholly unconfined. Following up 
this work by firing shots exposed to an 
artificial break, he found that such shots could 
cause ignitions with charges much below the legal 
maximum, and a test was designed to enable the 
safety of explosives under these conditions to 
be determined under controlled laboratory 
conditions. This consists (xi) of firing 
charges from a cannon facing directly into the 
space/ 
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space between two parallel steel plates. At 
present this is purely a research apparatus and 
forms no part of the official test. 
Development in explosives technology abroad 
has followed a roughly parallel trend with that 
in this country, with gallery tests imposing 
minimum standards to be attained by explosives 
for use in specific circumstances. A notable 
exception is that of France where, following the 
investigations of the French Commission in 
1887 -88 (xii), regulations were introduced 
specifying maximum calculated detonation 
temperatures to be allowed for explosives for 
use in coal and rock, without imposing any 
charge limits. At the present day a gallery 
test is employed to ensure that explosives 
satisfying theoretical requirements do not behave 
dangerously under practical conditions, and 
charge limits are imposed on all types of 
explosive authorised for use in gassy and dusty 
mines. 
An interesting development in the field of 
explosives testing is the angle mortar test. 
In this the charge is fired lying in a section 
cut out of a cylindrical mortar, so placed that 
the products of detonation impinge on a ricochet 
plate. The angle of the mortar groove, the 
distance to the plate and the angle of incidence 
can all be varied and this test forms part of 
the official examination for sheathed explosives 
in/ 
in Belgium. 
Exploders for use in Coal Mines 
All exploders which are to be used in a 
mine must be approved by the Ministry of Power, 
and in a mine or part of a mine where permitted 
explosives are required to be used exploders 
must be additionally approved as safe for use 
in gassy atmospheres. (xiii) 
The basic essential of all electric 
exploders is that they should,when correctly 
operated,be capable of passing adequate current 
through the external circuit of cable and 
detonators to ensure that all the detonators fire. 
With single shot firing, no difficulty is 
experienced in satisfying this requirement and 
also making the exploder safe for operation in 
methane /air mixtures. In operation an armature 
is rotated between the poles of a set of 
permanent magnets by a detachable firing key. 
Multi -shot exploders approved for use in 
gassy coal mines are rated at 6 -shot capacity, 
and the principle involved is different from 
single -shot machines. A 67i volt dry battery 
is used to charge a 150 microfarad condenser 
which is subsequently discharged into the firing 
circuit. This type incorporates a circuit 
continuity test powered by a 12 volt dry battery 
and operating an ohmmeter or bulb. The test 




button before firing is possible. 
For rounds of over six shots no exploder 
is as yet commercially available which is 
incapable of igniting firedamp. However, for 
firing large rounds in drifts and shafts the 
Divisional Inspector of Mines may give 
conditional approval to certain unapproved 
exploders, usually the Beethhoven. In 
operation, a small alternator, driven by an 
external detachable handle, has its voltage 
transformed and rectified to charge a 6 
microfarad condenser to a minimum of 1200 volts, 
indicated by a discharge in a small neon lamp. 
On firing, the condenser is discharged into the 
external circuit by operation of a button switch. 
This exploder is not by any means foolproof 
in the presence of explosive methane /air 
atmospheres and the conditions imposed by the 
Divisional Inspector must be rigidly observed 
if safety is to be ensured. 
Regulations (xiv) govern the maintenance and 
testing of all exploders and, in general, little 
trouble is encountered in their use. Research 
is now concentrated on the development of an 
approved device for firing rounds of up to 
15 shots in gassy mines, and means to make the 
firing of large rounds safer. 
Detonators for use in Coal Mines 
The basic requirement of a detonator is to 
produce/ 
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produce on firing a shock adequate to initiate 
detonation in an explosive cartridge in which 
it is embedded. In electric detonators this is 
achieved by using the heat generated by the current 
passing through a fine wire to fire a match -head 
composition Which in turn sets off priming and 
base charges. The above elements are enclosed 
in a metal tube and protected from moisture by 
a neoprene plug round which the neck of the tube 
is crimped. Where fuse firing is employed, the 
initial heat is obtained from the burning core 
of the fuse. 
Delay detonators are similar to plain 
electric detonators but the fusehead is designed 
to produce no appreciable gas pressure, as this 
could cause the priming and base charges to 
operate. Additionally a delay element, variable 
in composition and length, is introduced between 
the fusehead and the priming charge, to obtain 
varying intervals between the passing of the 
firing current and detonation of the explosive. 
The ignition of methane by Explosives and 
Ancillary Equipment 
1. Ignition by Explosives 
Three main methods by which methane /air 
mixtures may be ignited by explosives have been 
suggested - ignition by hot gases, by solid 
particles and by adiabatic compression - and no 
proof has yet been forwarded to discredit entirely 
or/ 
30. 
or establish beyond doubt the influence of any 
of these methods. 
(a) Ignition by hot gases. Following the 
discovery by Mallard and Le Chatelier that 
methane ignited on exposure to temperatures of 
600 - 700 °C., but only after an appreciable time 
lag which decreased with increasing temperature 
the so- called 'French doctrine' of 1890 was 
developed. This required that explosives on 
detonation should produce no solid particles or 
combustible gases, and that the maximum calculated 
temperature of detonation should not exceed 
1900 °C. for stone work or 1500 °C. for coal. 
Thus any ignitions obtained would almost 
certainly be due to hot gases, and the above 
theory tended to discount the idea of a charge 
limit, as the temperature produced is independent 
of the amount of explosive used. This is not 
borne out in gallery tests as any explosive 
may be made to cause ignitions by increasing 
the quantity detonated. 
This theory does not explain why the 
addition of certain salts greatly increases the 
safety margin of explosives under test conditions. 
Thus tests (xv) have shown that the safety of an 
explosive as measured by the official British 
gallery test is dependent on its strength and 
density. Nor does the theory explain why 
certain salts are much more effective than 
others. Common salt, present in most permitted 
explosives/ 
i 
explosives, exerts a very marked effect and is 
commonly referred to as a 'cooling agent'. As 
it has been shown (xvi) that a concentration of 
)4 mgs. /litre of fine sodium chloride is sufficien 
to prevent propagation of flame in highly 
explosive atmospheres, it would appear that the 
salt acts on the incendivity of the gallery 
methane /air mixture as well as that of the hot 
gases produced on detonation. 
(b) Ignition by solid particles. Although 
there is a great deal of evidence showing that 
hot particles are produced on detonation of 
explosives, ignition of methane /air mixtures unde 
such conditions has not been demonstrated 
conclusively. Photographs (xviii) have shown 
decomposing and undecomposing particles passing 
through a 9% methane /air mixture without causing 
ignition, although these particles have been 
found capable of igniting guncotton. 
(c) Ignition by adiabatic compression. All 
explosive atmospheres may be ignited by any sudden 
compression raising the temperature over the 
required ignition temperature of the mixture, and 
this effect could well be produced by the 
pressure created when an explosive detonates. 
This, however, also applies to alternatives to 
explosives, such as Cardox, as the required 
pressure is only about 450 lb. per square inch, 
and as no ignitions have been recorded with those 




close confinement necessary for the rapid rise 
in pressure could occur in practice. 
2. Ignition by Detonators 
The possibility of a methane /air mixture 
being_, ignited by a detonator is obviously 
extremely remote, as the energy produced is very 
small in comparison with that of the explosive 
cartridge in which it is embedded. No cases of 
ignition from this cause have been recorded in 
recent years. 
3. Ignition by Exploders 
Although the energy produced by exploders is 
also small compared with explosives, the 
possibility of ignitions from this cause is not 
so remote as with detonators. The mode of 
ignition is incendive sparking, generally in the 
cable, caused either by defective joints or the 
residual energy of the exploder being dissipated 
at the cable ends after the circuit has been 
broken by detonation of the explosive. It has 
not yet been found possible to produce commercially 
an intrinsically safe exploder for rounds of over 
six shots and two serious explosions have been 
attributed to sparking when a Beethhoven exploder 
was being used to fire large rounds in drifts. 
It is important to note, however, that the ignition 
occurs, not in the shothole, but outside it where 
careful testing will reveal the presence of a 
dangerous atmosphere, and in both the above 
explosions the Divisional Inspector in his report 
found/ 
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found that this elementary precaution had been 
skimped (xvii). 
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CHAPTER III 
UTILISATION OF EXPLOSIVES 
35. 
36. 
Explosives, offering an easy and convenient 
method of preparing coal and stone for hand and 
power loading, have been widely and increasingly 
employed in this country since their introduction 
in 1629. Between 1928 and 1954 the number of 
shots fired in mines under the 1911 Coal Mines 
Act increased from 50.4 to 99.4 millions, and 
over the same period the weight of explosive 
used increased from 25.5 to 51.9 million pounds. 
Graph III shows this sharp increase and also 
divides the total weight used into the different 
types, i.e. non- permitted, permitted, sheathed 
permitted and equivalent sheathed permitted. 
The total consumption, indicated by the bold 
black line, has risen almost continuously from 
the economically depressed days of the 1930's 
until the present day, but the efforts of the 
largest user, the National Coal Board, to reduce 
the use of explosives, coupled with a falling 
off in coal output have stopped this trend. 
Non -permitted explosives may only be used 
in naked light mines and shaft sinking operations, 
and a gradual reduction in their use is evident. 
Additionally, explosives of this type are 
generally of very high strength and not entirely 
suitable for coal getting operations on account 
of their extreme shattering action, and are now 
being replaced by weaker types for this work. 
Unsheathed permitted explosives were used 
to/ 
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to the extent of 14 -16 million pounds per annum 
between 1 922 and 1951, but are now employed 
mainly in stone mine drivages where the strongest 
explosive capable of passing the official test 
is required. 
Sheathed explosives formed an increasingly 
large percentage of the total consumption from 
the date of their introduction in 1933 until 
1949 when equivalent sheathed explosives were 
introduced. Only a very small quantity is now 
used. 
Equivalent sheathed explosives, offering 
enhanced safety advantages over all other types, 
have been increasingly employed since the first 
year of their marketing and now form by far the 
largest fraction of the total. When comparing 
the consumption of Eq.S. explosives with that of 
other types it is necessary to deduct 25% of the 
weight used, as the large percentage of inert 
material is all included in the weight marked on 
the cartridge. 
As stated above, the consumption of 
explosives has risen sharply in recent years, 
but this increase has not been accompanied by 
a coitmensurate increase in coal output. In fact 
the tons of coal produced per pound of explosive 
used fell from 9.2 in 1932 to 5.1 in 1945. Many 
theories have been advanced to account for this 
spectacular drop. Over the years thinner seams 
must be worked, with correspondingly more, 
although/ 
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although lighter, shots in coal and more stone 
work. Again the practice of providing workmen 
with free explosives instead of requiring each 
man to buy his own also grew over the same 
period. Neither of these theories are capable 
of closer examination, as the necessary figures 
are not available, but a third, which seeks to 
relate the increasing use of orthodox longwall 
working with the fall may be subject to a 
rough analytical examination. 
TABLE II 
Relationship of Coal Conveyed and Tons 
of Coal per Pound of Explosive 




Tons of Coal 
per Pound of 
Explosive 
x 




25 9.2 0.2 -0.70 1.38 
30 9.1 0.3 -0.52 1.48 
37 8.9 0.5 -0.30 1.57 
43 8.8 0.6 -0.22 1.63 
48 8.6 0.8 -0.09 1.68 
51 8.1 1.3 0.11 1.71 
54 7.6 1.8 0.26 1.73 
58 7.4 2.0 0.30 1.76 
61 7.1 2.3 0.36 1.79 
64 6.6 2.8 0.45 1.81 
65 6.3 3.1 0.50 1.81 
66 5.7 3.7 0.57 1.82 
69 5.4 4.0 0.60 1.84 
71 5.1 4.3 0.63 1.85 
When the two quantities, tons of coal per 
pound of explosive and percentage of coal 
conveyed by machinery, are plotted for the years 
over/ 
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over which the most serious decline took place 
- 1932 -L5 - it is apparent that a relationship 
does exist as indicated in Graph IV, although 
this is certainly not linear. Rather does the 
Graph appear to be of the form 
y = ax 
b 
+ c 
where y = tons of coal per pound of explosive 
x = percentage of coal conveyed by 
machinery 
b and a constants 
c = intercept on the y axis 
Extrapolation gives c a value of 9.4. 
To determine the values of the constants, the 
equation is put into the form 
- y = - c + ax hence 
(c - y) = axb and taking logs to the base 
10 of both sides 
log(c - y) = log axb 
= log a + b log x 
Let Y = log(c - y) 
A = log a 
X = log x 
So that 
Y = A + bX i.e. the equation of a 
straight line. 
As seen from Graph V, a plot approximating 
to a straight line is obtained and calculation 
of the gradient and intercept on the Y -axis gives 
values for A and b of -5.19 and 3.13. Hence 
the value of a, taking the antilog of -5.19, is 
found to be 6.46 x 10 
-6 
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curve is found to be 
-y = -9.4 +f6.46 x 10- 6)x)3'13 
i.e. y = 9.4 - 16.46 x 10- 
6(x)3.13 
The actual values of the constants are of 
little importance but serve to indicate that, 
over the period considered, a relationship does 
exist between the percentage of coal conveyed by 
machinery and the tons of coal produced per 
pound of explosive used. The assumption is made 
that the growth of longwall working is proportional 
to the percentage of coal mechanically conveyed. 
The reasons for this relationship are not 
immediately apparent or obvious but it is 
suggested that the growth of longwall working 
was accompanied by the development of 'pool' 
systems, whereby workers share the net earnings 
of the team, and thus do not feel so personally 
conscious of wasting their own money when charging 
shots. There has also been an increasing 
disinclination to the additional hard work 
involved in picking off any coal left hanging 
after shots and the temptation must be to 'make 
sure' with the shots. 
1I4. 
CHAPTER IV 
STATISTICAL STUDY OF THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF SHOTFIRING ACCIDENTS 
45. 
Any investigator studying shotfiring 
accidents is aided considerably by the fact that 
all such accidents, by reason of their nature 
and irrespective of severity, must be reported 
to the Mines Inspectorate, and a complete record 
is kept both by the Ministry of Power and the 
National Coal Board. Figures relating to mines 
operated by the National Coal Board are more 
readily available than those referring to all 
mines, and are used in this work wherever 
practicable, as over 90% of explosive is used 
and resultant accidents occur in the former 
class. Again, although the more general tables 
and statistics used and developed apply to the 
national figures, of necessity closer investi- 
:gation has been largely confined to the 
Scottish Division and even more particularly to 
the Lothians Area. 
The study of shotfiring accidents, in 
common with many other types, is complicated by 
the comparative infrequency of occurrence, 
indicated by the national average over the 
period 1934-56 of 3.647 accidents per million 
shots. For this reason alone it is obviously 
impossible to compare realistically two 
collieries on an accident rate basis alone, as 
even the largest collieries do not fire one 
million shots per year, and wide variations, 
which may be meaningless when statistically 
analysed, may be shown. 
It/ 
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It is necessary, however, to have a basis 
from which a reasonable figure or expectation 
may be worked out for a group of collieries. 
Shotfiring accident rates may be stated in 
several ways. 
(1) Accidents per man shifts or man hours. 
This is the common basis in industry and is, in 
fact, suitable for comparing the overall risk in 
different industries but is open to several 
objections when applied to this branch of mining 
work. 
(a) Idot all workers are subject to the risks 
attendant on shotfiring. Generally, only those 
men employed on face work, or haulage work near 
the face, are exposed and not all faceworkers 
are present on the shift or shifts when shot- 
:firing takes place. 
(b) In recent years great efforts have been 
made to reduce the proportion of manpower in 
collieries engaged on unproductive work not at 
the coal face. In 1948 all underground 
operations, excluding coal face work, required 
3Wi manshifts per 1,000 tons of output, but by 
1955 this figure had been reduced to 326. If 
the manpower thus freed is employed at the face, 
then the proportion of men exposed to risk will 
increase, and logically the figure of accidents 
per man shifts would also increase. Without 
closer examination it is impossible to tell 
whether/ 
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whether any significant change in care in the 
use and handling of explosives has taken place. 
(c) Over the same period (1948 -55) intensive 
efforts were made to introduce face mechanisation 
wherever possible to make the most efficient use 
of the skilled face labour available. Many 
forms of power loading eliminate shotfiring over 
the complete length of face, with the exception 
of stable holes, and most reduce it considerably 
compared with orthodox hand filled faces. Thus,. 
many manshifts will be worked with little or no 
risk of shotfiring accident and this should 
logically reduce the figure of accidents per 
manshifts, tending to cancel out the effect of 
(b) above. Again the true influence of this 
factor would be extremely difficult to assess 
analytically. 
(2) Accidents per million tons of output. 
Supporters of this criterion maintain that, if 
the figure of accident per million tons is kept 
to a minimum, then the accident situation is 
incapable of improvement. This, again, is 
suitable for comparing the overall accident 
position of collieries or groups of collieries 
but is unacceptable in the present analysis for 
the reasons give in 1 (a), (b) and (c). 
(3) Accidents per million shots. This basis 
is unaffected by the disadvantages of the other 
two given above and also takes into account the 
possible safety value of certain techniques of 
shotfiring/ 
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shotfiring, e.E., simultaneous and delay 
blasting, where several shots are fired at the 
same time and detonate together or within a short 
interval of time. It is thus used for the 
calculation of expectations in the following 
analyses. 
(a) The Distribution of Shotfiring Accidents over 
the Period 193L. - 1956 
Logically, the first step to be taken in 
the examination of the distribution of shotfiring 
accidents is to determine whether there has 
been any significant change in the national 
position in the years examined. When the 
accident rate is plotted on Graph VI, very sharp 
maximum and minimum values are shown. It is 
impossible by simple examination of this plot 
to determine the significance of these high 
and low values as considerable variations are to 
be expected on purely statistical grounds. 
To determine which, if any, variations are 
significant it is necessary to make certain 
assumptions. Thus, if the accident situation 
had in fact remained unchanged, the number of 
accidents to be expected in any year would 





where, E = expectation for any year 
N = number of shots fired in that year 
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1934 206 53.28 3.87 1D4.o 
1935 233 54.37 4.29 198.0 
36 210 58.66 3.58 214.0 
37 226 63.04 3.59 230.0 
38 232 63.71 3.64 232.5 
39 237 65.76 3.61 240.0 
1940 240 66.64 3.60 243.0 
41 243 64.49 3.78 236.5 
42 247 66.83 3.69 243.5 
43 247 67.3.4 3.67 245.5 
44 285 67.85 4.20 247.0 
1945 259 66.47 3.90 242.0 
46 295 71.75 4.12 261.5 
47 310 74.63. 4.16 272.o 
48 365 78.62 4.64 286.5 
49 386 82.99 4.66 302.0 
1950 325 85.71 3.79 312.5 
51 292 91.16 3.20 332.0 
52 336 94.97 3.54 346.o 
53 333 96.92 3.)1)1 353.o 
54 271 99.38 2.73 362.o 
1955 279 99.41 2.81 362.5 
56 268 100.67 2.66_ 367.0 
E0.6325 En.1734.65 
Notes: (1) Figures from the Annual Reports of 
H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines 
(2) Accident figures refer to total 
number killed and injured. 
GRAPH VI 
ACCIDENT RATE PER MILLION SHOTS FOR MINES 









Zn = total number of shots fired in the 
same period 
20 
is found to have a value of 3.647 n accidents per million shots for the 
period 1934 - 56. 
From this table the observed number of accidents 
or observation (0) may be compared with the 
calculated expectation (E). The X2 (chi - 
squared) test may be used to determine the 
probability that the variation between these 
numbers is due to chance fluctuations by 
2 
evaluating x 2 = 2 
E 
E) for each year, and 
comparing the results obtained with statistical 
2 
tables giving values of corresponding to 
different probabilities. In practice, it is 
more convenient to plot the parabolae obtained 
2 
by solving (0 
E 
E) 
= x 2 with % 2 being given 
values of 2.706, 5.413, 9.550, corresponding to 
probabilities of 90%, 98% and 99.8% respectively, 
on a plot of observation against expectation. 
These curves, called confidence limits, cut the 
graph into seven regions, into one or other of 
which each year must fall. 
In the customary language of statistics 
any point is said to be: 
(1 ) very significantly worse than average 
if it falls above the 99.8% limit 
(2) significantly worse than average if 
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ACCIDENTS RESULTING FROM USE 
OF EXPLOSIVES OBSERVATION 
PLOTTED AGAINST CALCULATED 
EXPECTATION FOR EACH YEAR 
OF THE 23 -YEAR PERIOD 1934 -56 
Figures from the annual reports of 
H,M,Chief Inspector of Mines 
53. 
(3) indicatively worse than average if it 
3 
With 
falls between the 98% and 90% limits o) E 
(4) not significant if it falls between the 90% 
limits 
(5) indicatively better than average if it 
falls between the 90% and 98% limits 
(6) significantly better than average if 
it falls between the 98% and 99.8% 
limits 
(7) very significantly better than average 
if it falls below the 99.8% limits. 
With 
0 E 
In everyday language, a point lying on or 
outside the 99.8% limit has only two chances in 
one thousand of being there due solely to a 
chance fluctuation. 
It is clear from the graph that observation 
differs widely from the expectation for many 
years in the period considered, and that the 
variations are much too great to be explained 
by random fluctuation. In the 23 -year period 
points occur in the seven sub -divisions in the 
following frequency: 
Sub -division 
No. of Years occurring 










Graph VII shows that the accident position 
has not remained even approximately constant, and 
that the initial assumption on which the 
calculated expectations were based was hardly 
justified. Nevertheless, certain very definite 
trends may be seen. After a period of 9 years 
from 1934 - 43 in which time only one year fell 
outside the 'average' region, a period of 
deterioration from 1944 - 49 culminated in two 
exceptionally bad years of 1948 - 49. In 
January 1948, as a result of the high number of 
accidents occurring in the use and handling of 
explosives, a committee was appointed by the 
Minister of Fuel and Power 'to consider the 
precautions necessary to secure safety in the 
use of explosives in coal mines, and in 
particular to recommend in what way the 
effective exercise of these precautions can best 
be ensured in practice'. The report was 
published in May, 1950, and resulting from its 
recommendations a new Explosives in Coal Mines 
Order was enacted in 1951 to simplify and clarify 
many aspects of the old Order. 
It is interesting to trace the trend for the 
years immediately before and after the very 
significantly bad years of 1948 -49. In 1950, 
the position had improved to average, and this 
was followed in 1951 by a year indicatively 
better than average. The average years of 
1952 -53 were then followed by the very 
significantly/ 
55. 
significantly better than average years of 
1954- 55 -56, i.e. 
1947 - indicatively worse than average 
1948 - very significantly worse than 
average - Committee appointed 
1949 - very significantly worse than average 
1950 - average - Committee reports 
1951 - indicatively better than average - 
New E.C.M.O. 
1952 - average 
1953 - average 
1954 - very significantly better than average 
1955 - very significantly better than average 
1956 - very significantly better than average. 
Thus, although it would be tempting to say that 
the improvement was the direct result of new 
legislation, the figures do not bear this out 
entirely. The recent satisfactory improvement 
may certainly be due to the 1951 Explosives in 
Coal Mines Order but an improvement was shown 
from the very bad years of 1948 -49 before this 
came into force. It is suggested that the 
position had become so bad after years of gradual 
deterioration that a sudden tightening up became 
not only advisable but essential, and that this 
resulted in a voluntary improvement before the 
new legislation was enforced. In addition, as 
most shotfiring accidents are caused by projected 
material, and as the 1951 Explosives in Coal 
Mines Order contained no new proposals to 
alleviate/ 
alleviate this danger, the improvement must have 
been due, at least in part, to other factors. 
(b) The Geographic Distribution of Shotfiring 
Accidents 
The second step to be taken in accident 
analysis is to examine their geographic distribution 
and occurrence, and a different statistical 
technique is required. Thus, when comparing two 
accident figures x1, x2, resulting from the firing 
of shots n1 , n2, a two by two contingency table 
is formed. (ii) 
x1 n1 - x1 n1 





n1 + n2 - x1 - x2 n1 + n2 
and where every number in the table exceeds 20, 
^¡2 
the table may be evaluated for , and from 
tables the probability that the two figures are 
representative of the same population may be 
found. 
The value of )(4 2 is 
1x1 (n2 - x2) - x2 (n1 - x1 ), 2 ( n1 + n2 
n1 n2 (x1 + x2 ) (n1 + n2 - x1 - x2) 







- - x2 
n1 
ñ2 (1 - ñ1 
)1 
( n1 +n2 -x1 -x ) [X1(1 
ñ1 ( x1 
+ x2 ) 
2 
and as n1, n2 are invariably very large in 
comparison with x1, x2 in the study of shotfiring 
accidents n1 









In this work ñ1 = k is the ratio of the 
2 
number of shots fired in the areas under 
examination, and is regarded as the rates of 
anticipated probability of accidents in the two 
samples. 
2 (x1 - kx2) 2 x - k(x1 + x2) 
In the analysis that follows, each National Coal 
Board Division is comvared in turn with the rest 
of the country and the symbols used are as follows: 
x1 = Accidents in Division 
x1 + x2 = National total of accidents 
N = Number of shots fired in Division 
T = Number of shots fired in country 
k = Ratio of number of shots fired in 
Division to number of shots 
fired in rest of country, i.e. 
N 
T -N 
Confidence limits are obtained by plotting 
k(x1 + x2) against (x1 - kx2) for the values of 
X 2 given i.e. 2.706, 5.413 and 9.550. To 
enable trends in different divisions to be traced, 
one graph is prepared for each Division and a 
point plotted for each year. 
Tables IV - XI. The numbers of shots fired 
in N.C.B. mines by Divisions, the observed 
numbers of accidents and the calculated 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GRAPHS VIII -XVI SHOTFIRING ACCIDENTS IN NCB MINES 1950 -1957 
Each Division is compared with the rest of the rest of the country, using 
the ratio of the numbers of shots fired as the basis of comparison. One 
point is plotted for each yeer on the Divisional graph to enable any 




gives in full the meaning of the symbols used and the 
of the regions on the graphs. 
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Conclusions obtained from the Graphs. 
Graph VIII - Durham Division 
Only one year, 1950, falls outside the 90% 
confidence limits and this Division may be said 
to be representative of the country as a whole, 
following any national trends closely. 
Graph IX - Northern Division 
Every year falls inside the 90% limits and 
again this Division is typical of the country 
as a whole. 
Graph X - West Midlands and South East Divisions 
Only one year falls outside the 90% limits, 
and these Divisions are thus typical of the 
country. 
Graph XI - North Western Division 
Of the eight years considered, two are 
indicatively better than the average for the 
rest of the country. In addition the other 
six years are all individually better than 
average, but not sufficiently so to have any 
significance considered separately. There is 
thus a sound basis for concluding that the 
position in the Division is good in comparison 
with the rest of the country. 
Graphs XII and XIII - South Western Division 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this 
work the analysis is accurate only if every 
number in the contingency table exceeds 20, a 
condition not fulfilled when considering the 
South/ 
72. 
South Western Division. The effect of this 
is to exaggerate the significance of the results 
obtained,as seen in the plot for the Division, 
and it is necessary to employ the technique later 
used for comparison of areas to obtain a true 
assessment of the accident situation. The 
revised plot is seen in Graph XIII. It is 
interesting to note that a significantly bad year 
in 1953 was followed in 1954 by an indicatively 
good year in 1954, probably as the result of the 
compaign which would follow 1953. A period of 
average years 1955 -56 -57 followed indicating a 
return to normal conditions of care and attention. 
Graph XIV - East Midland Division 
In this division the points are scattered 
with no suggestion of markedly better or worse 
conditions than the rest of the country. Two 
years fall outside the 'non -significant' region 
of the graph, with one, 1953, being indicatively 
better than average and the other, 1956, 
indicatively worse than average. There is a 
suggestion of a trend towards improvement between 
1953 and 1956, but 1957 showed a return to 
average conditions. 
Graph XV - North Eastern Division 
In this Division, only two years are 
classified as average and two years are very 
significantly/ 
73. 
significantly better than the rest of the country. 
There is a trend to be followed, as with the 
East Midlands Division, but in this case a period 
of improvement in the years 1950 -53, excepting 
1951, is followed by a deterioration from the very 
good year of 1953 to the average year of 1956, 
but an improvement does occur in 1957 to 
indicatively better than average. 
Graph XVI - Scottish Division 
In the Scottish Division, only one year, 
1956, falls into the average classification and 
two years, 1953 and 1954, are very significantly 
worse than average. Scotland has in fact by 
far the worst record of shotfiring accidents of 
any Division and although it might tentatively be 
suggested that some improvement is being shown 
on the basis of the drop shown from 1953-54, 
1954 -55, 1955 -56, followed by a slight 
deterioration in 1957, more years will be required 
before it can be stated that the position has 
indeed improved. 
As Scotland has the worst shotfiring accident 
record, the logical step is now to continue the 
sub -division and compare areas to determine which, 
if any, account for an excessive proportion of the 
total. As already stated, the %2 analysis is 
inaccurate for small numbers but an observation 
can be compared with an expectation calculated 
on the ratio of the number of shots fired in the 
areas under consideration. Probabilities, and 
hence/ 
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hence confidence limits, are obtained by making 
use of the Poisson series which states that the 
probability P, of observing exactly x accidents 
when the expectation is E is 
e-E Ex 
(iv) 
and summing the cumulative terms in the Poisson 
series we find 
00 
E -E Er P(x,E) = r =x r? 
where P(x,E) is the probability of an observation 
being equal to or greater than x. Central 
confidence limits are obtained by assuming that 
there is an equal chance of observations being 
significantly high or low. 
The 90% confidence levels are obtained by 
solving P(x,E) = .05 and P (x -1 ,E) = .95 
for E, for successive integral values of x. 
Similarly, the 98% levels are obtained by solving 
P(x,E) = .01 and P(x -1 ,E) = .99, and the 99.8% 
are found by solving P(x,E) = .001 and 
P (x -1 ,E) = .999. 
In this examination, expectations for areas 
are calculated from the shotfiring accident 
rate of the rest of the Division, i.e. 
1-=-2 E = N D - N 
where, E = the expectation 
D = number of shots fired in Division 
N = number of shots fired in Area 
d = number of accidents in Division 
0 = number of accidents in Area. 
it/ 
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It is unfortunate from the point of view 
of this investigation that a reorganisation 
within the Scottish Division resulted in 
changes in boundaries of the Areas and that a 
general comparison is not possible for years 
before 195L.. 
Tables XII - XV. The numbers of shots 
fired in Scottish Division by Areas, the observed 
number of accidents, and the calculated 
expectation for years 1954 - 1957. 
TABLE XII - YEAR 1954 
Are a N D- N 0 d- 0 E 
West Fife 2.375 12.297 11 56 10.8 
Lothians 2.078 12.594 15 52 8.6 
Central West 1.856 12.816 3 64 9.3 
Central East 2.224. 12.4.48 8 59 10.6 
West Ayr 1.280 13.392 4. 63 6.05 
Alloa 1.138 13.534 10 57 4.8 
East Fife 1.601 13.071 9 58 7.1 
East Ayr 2.120 12.552 7 60 10.2 
D - 14.672 d - 67 
Table/ 
76. 
TABLE XIII - YEAR 1955 
Area N D- N 0 d- 0 E 
West Fife 2.248 12.389 11 45 8.15 
Lothians 2.166 12.471 9 47 8.15 
Central West 1.707 12.930 8 48 6.35 
Central East 2.281 12.356 4 52 9.6 
West Ayr 1.340 13.297 5 51 5.15 
Alloa 1.165 13.472 3 53 4.6 
East Fife 1.707 12.930 4 52 6.85 
East Ayr 2..023 12.614 12 44 7.0 
D- 14.637 d -56 
TABLE XIV - YEAR 1956 
West Fife 2.273 12.358 8 38 7.0 
Lothians 2.225 12.406 4 42 7.55 
Central West 1.655 12.976 7 39 4.95 
Central East 2.257 12.374 2 44 8.05 
West Ayr 1.271 13.360 5 41 3.90 
Alloa 1.108 13.513 3 43 3.55 
East Fife 1.609 13.022 8 38 4.7 
East Ayr 2.233 12.398 9 37 6.7 




TABT,F, XV - YEAR 1957 
Area N D- N 0 d- 0 E 
West Fife 2.202 12.053 6 42 7.7 
Lothians 2.214. 12.041 5 43 8.0 
Central West 1.595 12.660 6 42 5.3 
Central East 2.178 12.077 8 40 7.25 
West Ayr 1.227 13.028 2 46 4.3 
Alb a 1.152 13.103 6 42 3.7 
East Fife 1.558 12.697 7 41 5.05 
East Ayr 2.129 12.126 8 40 7.0 
D- 14.255 d -4.8 
Comments on the plots obtained. In the 
plots for West Fife, East Fife, East Ayr and West 
Ayr, on Graphs XVII, XXI, XXIII, XXIV, no 
variation between observation and expectation 
unexplainable by random fluctuation occurs, and 
it may be concluded that these areas follow the 
national trend closely. The Lothians, Àlloa 
and Central West Areas, Graphs XX, XIX, XXII, 
each have one year in the indicative regions 
but only in the Lothians Area is there any 
suggestion of a trend, in this case, towards 
improvement. In the remaining Area, Central 
East, on Graph XVIII, two out of the four years 
in the period examined are indicatively lower 
than the average for the other Areas, which 
serves/ 
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serves as an indication that the position there 
is better than the rest of the division. 
(c) The Distribution of Shotfiring Accidents by 
Location of Shot and Method of Initiation. 
Over 97% of all shots fired in collieries may 
be divided according to location into three 
categories, namely, shots in coal, in stone mines 
Ì 
and in rippings, and it is obviously important to 
determine if any type is more or less productive 
of accidents than might be expected from the 
relative numbers fired. The distribution of 
shots, by location and method of initiation, may 
be obtained for N.C.B. mines for recent years and 
the figures for 1958 are shown in Table XVI. 
Unfortunately, available accident reports do not 
normally specify the type of shot causing injury 
and this makes any exhaustive study of this part 
of shotfiring accident analysis impossible. 
However, a limited number of results, kept by the 
Safety Engineer of the Scottish Division of the 
N.C.B. for inclusion in a paper presented to the 
Institution of Mining Engineers (v), gave the 
results shown in Table XVII. To determine the 
significance of the differences between the 
observed number of accidents (0) and the 
expectation (E) calculated on the basis of the 
relative numbers of shots fired in each location, 
the 2 test is employed as before but with the 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a correction due to Yates (vi) which reduces the 
difference between the observed and expected 
numbers arithmetically by a half. 
i.e. x 2 = [(0 - E) ± 2l 2, 
E 
the positive sign applying when E > 0, and 
the negative sign applying when E K 0. 
Evaluating % 2 for the three locations we find: 
2 




stone mines = 25 = 1.25 
2 other 8.5 2. = 6.00 
locations 12 
Using the same terminology and standards as 
in the earlier part of the Chapter, we see that 
the values of % 2 obtained for shots in coal 
seams and stone mines show that no difference, 
unexplainable by random fluctuation, exists 
between the observed and expected values. 
However the figure of 6.00 calculated for % 2 
for shots in 'other locations' indicates that this 
type of shot is significantly more productive of 
accidents than the others at the 98% confidence 
level. This conclusion may also be derived 
graphically by plotting observation against 
expectation for each type of shot and this is 
done on Graph XXVI. 
The probable reason for this disparity is 




THE OBSERVED NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS [O] RESULTING FROM 
SHOTS IN COAL, STONE MINES, AND OTHER LOCATIONS, PLOTTED 



















placed that any debris projected may travel long 
distances without meeting any obstruction in places 
where several men may be working. Only effective' 
shelter can ensure freedom from accidents in these 
circumstances and where this is not provided or 
not used, the firing of these shots presents 
obvious hazard. 
Two important points must be made when 
considering these results. The figures, referring 
to the Scottish Division, relate to approximately 
15% of the national total and the value of 
conclusions drawn must be correspondingly limited 
Also it is almost impossible to obtain positive 
evidence of significantly low accident figures 
when the expectation is 5, when considering results 
for one year only. However, should the 
observation continue at the level at 2, as with 
shots fired in stone mines in Scotland, for 
several years, this would then become significant 
and the application of further statistical 
techniques would reveal this fact. 
It was hoped that some work could be done to 
determine the significance of the method of 
initiation of shots on the occurrence of accidents 
and, in particular, to show if the use of 
simultaneous and delay blasting had led to the 
reduction which might logically be expected on 
the grounds of reduced exposure to risk. Again, 
the information could not be obtained. It is 
evident, however, that further study of this 
branch/ 
88. 
branch of shotfiring accident analysis might, 
with the co- operation of the interested parties, 
give valuable results and pointers for the positive 
work of accident prevention. 
Conclusions 
(1) The statistical techniques used in this work 
developed originally by Wynn (vii) provide a 
ready and valuable means of demonstrating 
graphically the significance of differences 
between observed numbers of accidents and 
corresponding calculated expectations. 
(2) The accident rate in shotfiring operations 
has fluctuated violently over the period 193+ -56, 
and is now very significantly lower than the 
23 -year average. 
(3) The geographic distribution of shotfiring 
accidents is comparatively uniform. Only the 
Scottish and North Eastern Divisions show 
significant variations from the average for the 
rest of the country, with the position in Scotland 
being very bad and in the North East very good. 
In the Scottish Division no area is 
significantly bad but there is some indication 
that the position in the Central East Area is 
better than the rest of the Division. 
(4) On the very limited information available, it 
may be tentatively suggested that the firing of 
shots in rippings presents a greater hazard than 
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CHAPTER V 
SHOIT'IRING IN COAL 
Introduction 
Many variations, generally the result of 
local conditions and traditions, govern the 
method of work and, indirectly, the firing of 
shots on orthodox hand filled longwall faces, but 
normally the work of coal getting is cyclic and 
follows the pattern:- 
Coal production - coal stripping, shotfiring 
shift 
First preparatory - pack building, conveyor 
shift shifting, ripping 
Second preparatory - coal cutting 
shift 
Shotholes may be bored on any shift and in each 
case certain advantages and disadvantages accrue. 
On the coal filling shift the need for holes can 
be most accurately assessed but the addition of a 
hole borer, machine and cable to the complication 
already existing may cause confusion. On the 
preparatory shifts the concentration of men is 
lower but in most seams there is a tendency for 
the front of the coal to sag after the cutter 
has passed. This may result in holes bored on 
these shifts being wholly or partially cut off. 
It has been suggested, notably by the committee 
on the precautions necessary to ensure safety in 
the use of explosives in coal mines, that it 
would be desirable to have in large collieries 
a superior official who would be in charge of 
shotfiring practice, and would thus as part of 
his duties ensure that a suitable drilling 




underground would render a fixed pattern 
unsuitable but the constant supervision of this 
important operation in shotfiring is desirable, 
and even weekly inspection would ensure that 
indiscriminate boring is not taking place. 
(a) Shotfiring in coal with conventional methods 
and explosives 
As indicated in Table XVI over 756 of all 
shots fired in N.C.B. mines are in coal and of 
these over 90% are initiated by electric 
detonatora fired singly or simultaneously in 
rounds of up to six shots. It is immediately 
apparent that together these classes form the 
most important subdivision of shotfiring, and they 
are therefore considered in the greatest detail. 
When firing on a longwall face where 
permitted explosives only may be used, three 
methods may be employed, namely, single shot 
firing, single shots in groups of up to six and 
rounds of up to six shots simultaneously. The 
differences in procedure are slight and concern 
only the precautionary examinations and, for 
simultaneous firing,the nature of the detonator 
leads, cable and exploder used. Although the 
content and meaning of the Coal Mines (Explosives) 
Regulations, 1956, governing the work of shotfiring, 
are quite clear a discussion of the significance 
of the requirements forms the next section of 




analysis could be found. Each part of the 
procedure is examined and the provisions 
reviewed in the light of recent work on the 
subject. The shotfirer must: 
(1 ) Immediately before charging a hole test 
for gas at the mouth of the hole and all 
accessible places within ten yards, or twenty 
yards if the hole is within that distance 
of a roadhead on a longwall face. For group 
or simultaneous firing the examination is 
extended to include all the holes in the group 
or round, the area between the extreme holes and 
the waste, and all accessible places within ten 
yards of the extreme holes. 43 (5) b, (6) a. 
(The figures and letters refer to the relevant 
paragraphs and sections of the Regulations). 
It is certain that this part of the work 
of charging and firing shots is invariably skimped 
and frequently omitted. This must be condemned 
wholeheartedly, as investigations (i) have shown 
that is is almost always the existence of a 
considerable body of methane /air mixture, 
detectable with good standards of practice, which 
makes an ignition resulting from shotfiring 
evident and that the remedy for such occurrences 
lies largely in the shotfirers' hands. 
To determine the significance of that part 
of the test requiring examination at the mouth 
of the shotholes, a short series of experiments 
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trainings at the Heriot -Watt College. The 
airway, formed by 6 feet by 6 feet arch girders 
and brick lining, was partially blanked off 
with plasterboard, as indicated in Figure 11, to 
simulate conditions on a coal face. A steel 
tube, 1 
16 
inches internal diameter and 4 feet 
3 inches long was passed through the brick lining 
at an angle to the horizontal of 7 °, to represent 
a shothole. Gas was passed into the top of 
the 'shothole' through a meter and the velocity 
of the airflow produced by an axial flow fan was 
measured by vane anemometer. The flame safety 
lamp used for gas detection was a 'Protector' 
officials lamp, manufactured by the Protector 
Lamp and Lighting Co., and is the type most 
widely used in the Lothians Area. To support 
the lamp at any desired height in relation to the 
'shothole', an adjustable bracket was built and 
screwed to the wall. 
The experiments were divided into two parts. 
The first series of tests were designed to 
determine in what position the lamp could most 
sensitively detect emissions, and in the second 
series the lamp was held in that position, and the 
minimum emissions which could be detected with 
varying air velocities were determined. The 
results were subject to several sources of error, 
the greatest being the difficulty in measuring 
the air velocity accurately, as the observer's 
body occupied a considerable proportion of the 
available/ 
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available air space. It was also found that 
comparatively small obstructions, such as a 
hand, could increase or decrease the gas cap ob- 
:served. The effect produced depended on 
whether the air flow was restricted in the 
neighbourhood of the lamp, causing an increase, or 
channelled to flow past the lamp, causing a 
reduction. For those reasons it was extremely 
difficult to obtain reliable or repeatable results 
but the order of the emissions which are required 
before detection can take place make those 
reservations unimportant when considered in 
terms of practical applications. Certain main 
conclusions can, however, be drawn. 
(a) As might be expected, the greatest 
sensitivity is achieved when the gas ports of the 
lamp are opposite the top of the shothole. 
(b) For any given air velocity, a small change 
in emission from the shothole is sufficient to 
bring about a change in the lamp from a non - 
detectable cap to burning in the gauzes. In 
practice, the experimental variations referred to 
above completely overshadowed any variations 
caused by changes in the gas flow. 
(c) The minimum detectable emission increased 
with increasing air velocity. Due to 
experimental inaccuracies and the limit on the 
maximum gas flow imposed by the apparatus, it 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The minimum gas flows required to produce 
measurable gas cap (i%) with the lamp 
supported with ports opposite top of the 
shothole, in different air velocities. 
Air Velocity in feet Required gas flow 





120 Above the maximum 
which could be 
supplied. 
99. 
law governing the variation. 
In practice (ii) where gas flows from 
shotholes have been measured very low readings 
have been recorded, ranging from 0 to 150 mis. / 
min. for holes in solid coal to negligible quantities 
from holes in rippings. The minimum gas flows 
detected in the tests was very much greater than 
this, and where ventilation comparable with 
normal longwall standards is passing, very large 
gas flows would be required before detection with 
a flame safety lamp could be achieved. The 
difference in gas flows from holes in solid coal 
and rippings is especially significant, as the 
probability of ignition is approximately ten 
times higher with ripping than coal shots (ii). 
It would thus appear that that part of the test 
requiring examination at the mouth of Shotholes 
could well be omitted and the emphasis shifted 
on to a careful examination in all accessible 
places near the shothole. 
(2) Clean out shothole and test for breaks. 
24 (1) 45 (2). Every shotfirer in a mine in 
any part of which the use of lights other than 
permitted lights is unlawful, or where safety 
lamps are being used as a temporary precaution, 
must be provided with a scraper and break 
detector of approved design. These are combined 
to form one tool. 
Shotholes generally retain a considerable 
quantity/ 
quantity of coal dust from boring, and where this 
is introduced between cartridges the risk of 
non -detonation of part or all of the main charge 
is increased. 
The break detector is essentially a metal 
prong, not more than in. wide or thick at the 
32 
tip, attached to a rod or tube, and is designed 
to be capable of detecting any break of e" or 
over crossing the hole either longitudinally 
or transversely. No hole containing such a 
break may be charged. 
It is interesting to examine this legal 
requirement in the light of investigations 
carried out by the North Eastern Divisional 
Shotfiring Committee, detailed in their Third 
Report on Shotfiring in Yorkshire - The 
Ignition Hazard due to Shotfiring (iii). Tests 
carried out to determine the incidence and 
magnitude of breaks in undercut coal showed 
that out of 436 holes examined in the Top Hard 
seam only 40 were completely free from breaks 
and 247 had breaks which would cross the 
explosive charge. Many of the breaks were 4" 
or more wide and could be identified in several 
holes. In many cases the firing of a shot 
resulted in the creation of new breaks or the 
enlargement of existing breaks in nearby holes. 
Roof conditions affected the total number of 
breaks, but even in exceptionally good conditions 




increased. Similar tests in other seams showed 
that the incidence of breaks was dependent on the 
nature of the coal, but comparable frequencies 
were obtained confirming the results above. Tests 
in solid coal seldom revealed breaks and those 
which did occur were almost invariably in the 
front of the coal, 
Gas analysis of samples taken from holes 
before shotfiring showed that 70% contained 
methane /air mixtures above the upper inflammable 
limit, and less than 10% within the limits. 
Samples taken from a hole before and after 
shotfiring in an adjacent hole revealed a 
reduction in methane content and thus a 
tendency for the atmosphere in the hole to be 
brought within the explosive limits. 
It is evident from these results that the 
phenomenon of visible ignitions resulting from 
the use of explosives must be due to factors 
other than the occurrence of breaks of 4" width 
containing methane /air mixtures within the 
inflammable limits crossing the charge, as these 
primary requirements are apparently satisfied in 
a comparatively large number of shotholes. An 
investigation in 1943 (i) of several ignitions 
of methane following shotfiring revealed that 
breaks of considerable width had crossed the 
explosive charge, but also that only because 
considerable bodies of methane were present were 
the ignitiorisnoticed. In most cases this could 
have/ 
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have been detected on careful examination with 
a flame safety lamp and the need for careful 
and comprehensive precharging and prefiring gas 
tests is thus emphasised. 
(3) Compare the depth of the shothole(s) with 
the undercut or shear. )4.. In situations 
where permitted explosives only may be used, shots 
in coal must have an additional free face 
provided, and the depth of this must be greater 
than the depth of the shothole. This requirement, 
which does not apply to anthracite mines or cross 
measure drifts crossing a coal seam,ensures that 
efficient use is made of the explosive and that 
the possibility of a blown out shot is minimised. 
The ignition risk attendant on a shot blowing 
out is very small, as it is under these conditions 
that an explosive is tested for official 
approval. However, holes in undercut coal 
require approximately one -fifth the charge 
necessary for shots with a comparable burden in 
solid coal and a considerable reduction in 
explosives consumption is thus achieved. 
Where coal cutters are fitted with an 
efficient gummer, the cleaning of the cut is 
achieved mechanically but the operation of 
hand gumming is difficult, requiring in many 
cases the use of a special shovel. There is 
naturally a tendency for this work to be 
skimped, should the shotfirer not insist on it 
being carefully carried out. 
(LE)/ 
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(4) Seal the back of the hole (s) with plugs 
of stemming. 48 a. 
Following the discovery (i) that shots 
fired partially confined constituted a dangerous 
ignition hazard, the principle of testing for 
breaks was introduced. Sealing the back of 
the hole provides a protection for a break 
undetectable by the normal approved detector. 
(5) Charge the shothole. (a) Ensure that 
there is no charged shothole within 30 yards 
of the hole about to be charged 25 (3). This 
provision does not apply to simultaneous firing. 
By experience it has been found that confusion 
with cables may result in the wrong shot being 
fired when shotfirers are working close together, 
and the distance of 30 yards chosen allows a 
reasonable safety margin without causing undue 
interference to the normal working in a section. 
(b) Ensure that the hole is not overcharged. 
26 (5). The amount of explosive required 
for any shot is dependent on so many factors, 
including the nature of the coal, the burden of 
the shot and the number of free faces present, 
that literally only after a shot has been fired 
is it possible to say definitely whether it has 
been correctly charged. Certainly, the number 
of holes wasted through undercharging is small 
in comparison with those which are overcharged, 
but the heavy manual labour involved in 
picking down coal not dislodged by a shot not 
unnaturally/ 
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unnaturally creates a tendency for more 
explosive to be used than is strictly necessary. 
(c) Ensure that only complete cartridges of 
the same type and diameter are used, and that 
these have 8" diametral clearance in the shot hole. 
It is essential that enough cartridges of small 
weight are included in the supply to the face to 
remove any temptation from the shotfirer to split 
cartridges. When faced with the alternative of 
breaking the law by either overcharging a hole, 
or cutting a cartridge, a shotfirer invariably 
chooses the latter course, and this may lead to 
the jettisoning of explosives underground. 
(d) Ensure that the explosive is permitted, 
where this is required 2 (1), (2), (3), a, b, c, 
M. No chance of confusion exists in most 
collieries, as only permitted explosives may be 
taken below ground in a mine in any part of which 
the use of permitted lights is required. 
However, in naked light mines permitted explosives 
must be used when safety lamps are being used as 
a temporary precaution, in intake airways, in 
or within 30 feet of haulage road or in a 
place designated dry and dusty by a Mines 
Inspector, and a real possibility exists of non - 
permitted explosives being used. A close 
control must be kept on the issue and transport 
of explosives to these situations. 
(6) Prepare the primer cartridge. This is 
done by piercing the cartridge with a non- 
ferrous, 
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ferrous pricker, inserting the detonator, and 
hitching the leading wires round the cartridge 
to prevent withdrawal of the detonator on 
charging. 
(7) Stem the shothole with sufficient suitable 
non -inflammable material 28(i). Experiment has 
shown (iv) that the most suitable stemming 
material is moist sand with sufficient clay 
added to render the mixture easily shaped into 
plugs for insertion into a shothole. In 
practice, a large variety of materials are used 
and not infrequently the stone dust provided in 
the gates is mixed into clay with water and 
formed into pellets. When a large number of 
shots are fired in a shift, the temptation to 
use readily available but undesirable coal dust 
is increased, and only a sense of responsibility 
in the shotfirer, coupled with supervision from 
higher officials, can eliminate the practice. 
(8) Determine the danger zone likely to be 
created by the firing of the shot(s) 35(1 ), and 
post and instruct sentries or erect fences on all 
approaches to the shot(s). Should an excess 
quantity of explosive be used, or should the shot 
blow out, material will be projected often with 
considerable violence over great distances, and 
the determination of the danger zone must take 
this possibility into account. It is tempting 
and trite to say that the occurrence of an 
accident reveals a failure on the part of the 
shotfirer/ 
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shotfirer to fulfill the requirement of this 
section. However, this is an extremely difficult 
problem, dealt with in greater detail later in 
this work. 
(9) Make a prefiring examination for gas at 
each shothole and at the edge of any waste 
opposite ¿43 (6) b. This is necessary to ensure 
that no dangerous emissions of firedamp have 
occurred in the interval between the precharging 
tests and the prefiring test. 
(10) Prepare to fire the shot(s). 
(a) Connect the detonator leads to a cable of 
the correct type and minimum length 37 (3). No 
minimum distance from the shot is specified, but 
with single shot firing a cable of not less than 
sixty feet must be used, and for simultaneous 
firing in coal the corresponding length is one 
hundred and fifty feet. With simultaneous firing 
the detonator leads must be copper 27 (3) b, the 
detonators must be connected in series and no 
additional wire may be used to connect the leads 
to each other or the cable 32 (2) a, b. This 
is necessary to ensure that the resistance of the 
external circuit does not become so high that 
missfires would result. 
(b) Ensure that the cable is kept free and 
clear of all electrical apparatus, including 
cables 32 (4). Low tension detonators are very 
sensitive and comparatively small applied voltages 




(c) When simultaneous firing is being 
employed, test the circuit for continuity 32 (7). 
All approved six -shot exploders incorporate a 
continuity test and the use of this at once 
indicates an open circuit in the external wiring, 
a possibility which is much greater with the 
larger number of connections in multi -shot 
firing. The continuity test is also indispensable 
for isolating a detonator with a broken internal 
connection. 
(d) Fire shot(s) after ensuring that everyone 
is in shelter. 
(11) Make an after firing examination for gas 
and general safety, recall and instruct workmen 
on any steps to be taken 37 (1) a, b. This 
requirement, which imposes on the shotfirer an 
obligation to return to the scene of the shot(s) 
before the workmen, was first introduced in the 
Explosives in Coal Mines Order (1951) and is 
designed to ensure that he, with his presumably 
greater experience, will guide the men on any 
steps which may have to be taken to make the 
place secure. 
(12) With group firing, proceed at once to 
charge the next hole in the group. 
Fuse firing, when permitted, is exempt from 
many provisions of the Regulations, and all the 
;requirements designed to prevent ignitions of 
methane are omitted. Certain articles, 
inapplicable/ 
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inapplicable to electric shotfiring, are 
introduced and these relate to the minimum 
lengths of fuses for single shots and rounds, 
(three and four feet respectively) the allowable 
proximity of naked lights to explosives and 
detonators, (four feet and not directly above) and 
the minimum separation of chargedshotholes when. 
firing single shots (50 yards). Fuse firing 
is now of little importance, and only in the 
Scottish Division is it practiced to any 
appreciable extent. 
The comparative importance of single shot, 
group and simultaneous firing may be judged by 
reference to Table XVI, which shows that single 
shot and group firing account for 70%, and 
simultaneous firing 20%, of all shots in coal. 
Simultaneous firing is not altogether suitable 
for orthodox longwall working, as the 
instantaneous detonation of up to six shots 
would result in a large amount of roof being 
exposed. Because of the comparatively slow 
speed of hand filling, this would be unsupported 
for a considerable time. In fact, this method 
has found its greatest application on power 
loading installations, where the machine 
employed requires some preparation of the coal 
by explosives. In these situations it is 
important to note that a team of men is available 
to set supports immediately the coal has been 
loaded/ 
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loaded out, and that the delay with single shot 
firing would result in an expensive machine 
not being used to its full capacity. 
No differentiation between single shot and 
group firing can be made but it is interesting 
to note that the Regulations place an 
obligation on the shotfirer to employ group 
firing 'if shots are to be fired singly in 
succession in coal along a longwall face' (v). 
The difference in practice is slight, concerning 
only the precautionary examinations, and it is in 
any case doubtful if the average practising 
shotfirer could identify his method with either 
of the alternatives allowed in the Regulations. 
(b) Shotfiring in Coal with Alternatives to 
Explosives 
When the dangers inherent on firing 
explosives were realised, attempts were made to 
alleviate the hazard by introducing devices which 
could perform the task of explosives without the 
attendant risk. Many of these quickly became 
curiosities because of their impracticable 
nature, but recently interest in this branch of 
blasting technology has been revived in the drive 
to minimise the dangers and increase the 
efficiency of shotfiring operations. The term 
'alternatives to explosives' although not strictly 
grammatically correct, has been accepted as 
referring mainly to steel tube blasting devices, 
designed to provide the useful feature of 
explosives/ 
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explosives - large volumes of gases at high 
pressure - without the attendant disadvantages - 
the initial shock wave on detonation and the high 
temperature of the gases produced. Reference 
to Table XVII shows that in 1958, 4% of the 
annual total of shots were fired with these 
devices, mainly in coal seams. 
The three common systems in this country 
employ a steel tube in which the pressure is 
caused to rise to a predetermined value, when an 
expendable plate, pin or plug shears, allowing the 
gas produced to flow into the shothole. 
Extensive literature is available giving full 
details of the technical features of the shells, 
and only a brief description is given here. In 
the Cardox system the charge of liquid carbon 
dioxide is raised above its critical temperature 
by a heater unit, initiated by a normal 
approved exploder, and the rupturing of a shear 
disc allows the escape of the carbon dioxide under 
high pressure into the shothole. The action of 
the Hydrox shell is similar but the charge is 
a mixture of solids which react under influence 
of heat and pressure to evolve a large volume 
of gases. In the most recent type, the charge, 
heater and shear plug are incorporated in a 
composite unit, allowing reloading of the shells 
to be carried out at the face. The Airbreaker 
system employs compressed air as the blasting 
medium, and requires a connection to be maintained 
between/ 
between the shell and the compressor. Unlike 
the other systems, the discharge of the shell 
is controlled mechanically by a firing valve. 
Alternatives to explosives possess advantages 
and disadvantages when compared with conventional 
explosives and each other, and it is this balance 
which controls the introduction of these devices 
in any particular set of circumstances. Thus 
the advantages may be summarised as follows: - 
1 . Freedom from the dangers of ignition of 
methane /air mixtures. 
As already pointed out in Chapter II, any 
device operating at over 450 pounds per square 
inch can give rise to ignitions in methane /air 
mixtures by causing adiabatic compression in the 
mixture. It is, however, extremely doubtful if 
the necessary close confinement could be 
achieved underground, as the first movement of 
the material being blasted would afford a partial 
release of pressure and will thus prevent the 
necessary temperature rise. Certainly no 
ignitions have been recorded with these devices 
underground, and their high margin of safety in 
the presence of methane /air mixtures is recognised 
in the Coal Mines (Cardox and Hydrox) Regulations, 
'1956, which impose much less strict requirements 
than the corresponding Explosives Regulations. 
In particular, their use is permitted in the 
roof of longwall workings between the coal face 
and the waste, in which situation conventional 
explosive/ 
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explosive is completely forbidden. 
The risk of ignitions is not entirely 
eliminated by the use of alternatives to 
explosives, as Cardox and Hydrox require 
conventional exploders which may become dangerous 
if defective, and Airbreaker compressors sited 
underground may overheat should protective 
switchgear become defective. Experience has 
shown that these possibilities are more apparent 
than real, and it was undoubtedly the high safety 
margin of these alternatives to explosives which 
originally led to their introduction in 
situations where high methane emissions might be 
expected. Recently, however, economic reasons 
have brought about their introduction in 
comparatively risk free environments. 
2. Improvement in the size analysis of the 
coal product. 
All conventional permitted explosives are of 
the detonating type, and the production of gas is 
accompanied by a shock wave on detonation. This 
property is of great value when hard materials 
are being blasted and the velocity of detonation 
of an explosive is one of the controlling factors 
influencing its ability to shatter strong rocks. 
In coal blasting work, however, this property is 
not required or even desirable and leads to 




Alternatives to explosives produce the 
gases necessary for blasting without the initial 
shock wave, and the same energy is released 
over a much larger time interval than is the 
case with conventional explosives. They thus 
exert a comparatively mild action on the material 
being blasted and are not suitable for blasting 
hard or very fissured rocks. The shattering 
effect of conventional explosives may be reduced 
by lowering the velocity of detonation but 
cannot be eliminated altogether. Tests carried 
out in a joint investigation by the Institution 
of Mining Engineers and the National Coal Board, 
and reported in the Fourth Report of the 
Committee on Shotfiring and its Alternatives - 
A comparison of various methods of shotfiring 
(vi) showed that in the same seam, there was no 
significant difference in size analysis of the 
product when detonating explosives were used, 
whether the shots were fired singly, simultaneously, 
in rounds of short delays, with pulsed infusion 
shotfiring or orthodox single shots in coal 
wetted by infusion. For each method, the 
percentages of the oversizes were plotted 
against the size of the screen openings to which 
they related in accordance with the Rosin - 
Rammler method and a measure of the coarseness 
of the material obtained by noting the screen 
size corresponding to an oversize of 36.79%, 
as is usual with this method. Conventional 
explosives/ 
explosives gave a screen size of 3 inches, 
whereas Cardox (the alternative used in the 
tests) gave a corresponding size of 4 inches. 
Those results are very valuable, as they give 
one of the few records of tests carried out by 
the same people in the same situation, under 
closely controlled conditions, and are thus free 
from the temporary improvement which may be 
effected when any new method is first 
introduced. Although the tests refer only to 
Cardox blasting, there is no reason to suppose 
that the other alternatives would produce 
inferior results. 
3. A high rate of firing may be maintained. 
Because of the high margin of safety of 
these devices in the presence of methane /air 
mixtures, the procedure for firing is greatly 
simplified in comparison with conventional 
explosives. This reduces the time taken to 
fire a single shot to approximately eight 
minutes, as reference to Chapter VII, page158, 
and the Coal Mines (Cardox and Hydrox) 
Regulations, 1956, shows that operations 1, 2, 
4, 6 and 7 may be omitted. Where conditions are 
suitable, a face may be precharged with Cardox 
and Hydrox and a further saving in time would 
result. 
When Airbreaker installations are used very 
high firing rates can be maintained, as 
reloading the shell involves only the replacement 
of/ 
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of the expendable shear pin or disc, and the 
same shell is re -used for each shot. No 
legislation as yet directly affects the firing 
of Airbreaker shots, and until this is placed 
on a similar footing to the other alternatives 
any comparison in firing rates would be 
profitless. 
4. Reducation in projected material. 
As the shotfirer has only very limited 
control over the energy released on the firing 
of the shot with alternatives to explosives 
(page 116) it might be expected that their 
use in holes where the burden is small would 
result in an excessive amount of material being 
projected. In practice it appears that venting 
provided by the first movement of the coal or 
stone being blasted allows any excess energy to 
be dissipated harmlessly. With conventional 
explosives the available energy is released so 
rapidly any excess over actual requirements 
causes breakage of the coal and projection of 
any available coal or stemming. Unfortunately, 
due to the comparatively limited numbers of shots 
fired with these alternatives, and the limited 
accident information available this cannot be 
proved or disproved analytically but visual 
indications at an installation of an Armstrong 
Airbreaker visited, and the opinion of 
experienced mining engineers, do indicate a 
considerable/ 
considerable reduction in the hazard from 
projected material. 
5. Reduction in fume and dust production. 
Although the funs produced by modern permitted 
explosives are almost completely non -toxic, the 
use of alternatives eliminates any possibility 
of poisoning from this count. 
As a corollary of increased large coal 
production with alternatives to explosives, dust 
production is generally reduced and this leads to 
an improvement in environmental conditions. 
The disadvantages of alternatives to explosives 
may be summarised: 
1. A very limited range of powers are 
available. 
Although shells are manufactured in a 
considerable variety of diameters and volumes, 
the dimensions are normally standardised for a 
district in a colliery, and often for the 
complete colliery. Thus, the size of the 
Cardox and Hydrox shell must be decided on the 
most arduous duty likely to be encountered, 
and the use of this size in other situations 
implies economic disadvantages in employing a 
device too powerful for actual requirements. 
In Airbreaker installations a limited degree of 
control can be exercised by varying the thickness 
of the shearing pin or plate but, compared with 
faces using conventional explosives where a 




regularly be used, the control is very limited. 
It would thus appear that alternatives to 
explosives would be under a great disadvantage 
under this head but, in practice, this is not 
noticeable. 
2. Risk of projected shells. 
Shells have forward facing gas ports or 
sprags operated by the escaping gases as a 
precaution to prevent the ejection of the shell 
from the hole. However, should reasonably rapid 
release of pressure not occur, the gases may build 
up sufficient pressure behind the shell to cause 
violent projection of the shell. Paragraph 
18 (1) b of the Coal Mines (Cardox and Hydrox) 
Regulations, 1956, states that no one shall 
fire a shot unless 'measures of a kind specified 
by the Manager of the mine have been taken to 
ensure that the shell is not ejected in a 
dangerous manner on firing'. The consequences 
could be very serious indeed and much more 
damage could be caused by a large heavy shell 
than the comparatively limited amount of 
material projected by a shot with conventional 
explosive. 
3. Inconvenience of 'fizzers'. 
When the heater of a Cardox or Hydrox shell 
operates, but the pressure does not rise to the 
value necessary to shear the disc or plug, an 
interval of ten minutes must be observed before 
the shell is approached. These occurrences 
are/ 
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are much more frequent than missfires with 
conventional explosives, and have a very high 
'nuisance value'. 
In Airbreaker installations, should the disc 
or nail fail to shear, the shell can be 
immediately vented to atmosphere, and the fault 
rectified safely without any waiting period. 
4. Inflexibility. 
Conventional explosives may be carried 
conveniently to any place in a colliery, but 
the use of alternatives generally requires fairly 
uniform working conditions to make the transport' 
arrangements for shells economically feasible. 
5. Maintenance. 
All Cardox and the older type of Hydrox 
shells must be inspected at least once in 90 
days, and this interval is reduced to 30 days 
for the new type Hydrox shell. This means that 
all shells must be numbered and checked regularly. 
Records of all such examinations must be kept. 
6. Shothole drilling. 
Alternatives to explosives generally require 
the use of large shotholes and this may create 
some difficulty in boring. In addition, as no 
stemming is used, holes are drilled to give 
little diametral clearance round the shell and 
in seams where the front of the coal tends to 
sag after cutting, holes must be drilled as soon 
as possible before blasting to ensure easy entry 
of the shell into the hole. 
7./ 
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7. Difficulties in handling underground. 
In seams of limited height the handling of 
long heavy shells, accompanied in . airbreaker 
installations by lengths of hose, can present 
considerable practical difficulties, and it is 
likely that the minimum height for Airbreakers 
will be at least 2 ft. 9 in. 
On occasion, the shell may be buried in the 
pile of blown debris and recovery may take some 
time. 
8. Limitation in application. 
Although the freedom from the shock wave on 
initiation is a very desirable property when 
coal is being blasted, it places limitations on 
the applicability of alternatives in other 
situations. This invariably means the 
employment of both alternatives and conventional 
explosives, with the accompanying disadvantages 
of duplicated records, storage facilities, etc. 
As already mentioned, each alternative offers 
certain advantages and disadvantages in 
comparison with the other two types. Thus the 
Cardox system requires complicated charging 
plant, a pit supply of 300/ of the normal days 
requirement of shells, and arrangements for the 
transport of shells underground. It is, 
however, the only alternative which may be used 
for simultaneous firing. The new Hydrox 
requires fewer shells as it may be recharged at 
the face, and is suitable for small scale trials 
as/ 
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as no charging apparatus is required. Armstrong 
Airbreaker installations are comparatively 
inflexible, but where uniform working conditions 
exist, shells may be 'reloaded' and fired more 
quickly than the other types. 
The study of the economics of alternatives 
to explosives in comparison with conventional 
explosives, or the comparison of one type 
with the other two, is a very involved subject 
and not within the scope of this work. So many 
variables must be taken into account, including 
capital charges, depreciation, maintenance, and 
intended utilisation that any assessment must 
be based on local factors. However, it 
appears that when outputs of 500 tons per day 
may be prepared by an Airbreaker installation, 
the cost expressed in pence per ton may be 
equal to conventional explosives, and any size 
increase in the coal product will result in 
economic advantages. 
With the Hydrox system, the cost per shot 
remains approximately constant no matter how 
many shots are fired, as the main expense is 
the cost of the charge. The cost of preparing 
the coal will always be more than with 
conventional explosives. Cardox suffers from 
high transport costs, and again the cost 
expressed in pence per ton of output will be 
high. It must, however, be remembered that the 
introduction of alternatives may be dictated as 
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a precautionary measure in situations considered 
to present an unusually high methane hazard, and 
in these cases any economic disadvantages which 
may arise will not be considered so important. 
(c) Shotfiring in coal with alternative methods. 
1. Pulsed infusion shotfiring. 
The use of water under pressure to infuse 
coal seams and thus assist in the suppression 
of dust is now a well known and widely applied 
technique, (viii), and since 1954. this has been 
combined with the use of explosives to prepare 
coal seams for hand or power loading. The 
technique, developed originally to reduce the 
possibility of ignition of methane by explosives, 
has also been claimed to offer advantages of 
increased large coal production, reduced 
explosives consumption, the elimination of the 
need for conventional stemming and the 
reduction of airborne dust produced on shotfiring. 
The use of the method has been widely and 
fully described in technical literature (ix) 
and only a very brief description is included 
here. Submarine detonators and a special 
explosive capable of detonating satisfactorily 
under high pressures are required. In under- 
:cut coal, the shothole is charged, an infusion 
gun sealed in the hole and the shot fired from 
a station, after it has been ensured from the 
readings on a combined flowmeter /pressure gauge 
that the water is flowing satisfactorily and 
that/ 
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that the hole is offering adequate resistance. 
Only in exceptional cases does undercut coal 
offer enough resistance to a flow of water for 
this method to be applicable, as the operation 
of cutting normally induces breaks of consider - 
:able width to be formed in the coal seam. In 
solid coal, this technique may be used on 
longwall faces to prepare the coal for hand or 
power loading, or for longhole blasting in 
either level or highly inclined seams. The 
method has found its greatest application in the 
preparation of stable holes on power loading 
faces where the complication of a coal cutter 
is not justified, and where the high explosives 
consumption resulting from blasting off the solid 
is of little importance for the limited output 
won. Recently, millisecond delay blasting 
in conjunction with pulsed infusion shotfiring 
has been introduced, and offers the advantages 
of greater speed and reduced exposure to risk. 
The advantages of this method are: - 
(a) Freedom from the possibility of ignitions. 
As early as 1872 mining explosives were 
employed in conjunction with water cartridges 
to reduce their high incendivity, and the 
Report of the Royal Commission on Accidents in 
Mines in 1886 concluded that all detonating 
explosives, if used in conjunction with water 
cartridges or porous, water soaked tamping 
were safe, if a shot blew out into an 
inflammable/ 
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inflammable atmosphere. It is important to note 
that the tests employed imitated the conditions 
occurring when a shot blew out without doing any 
work, as this was thought to be the most 
dangerous situation possible. It is now held, 
however, that ignitions occur when an explosive 
charge is detonated in partial confinement, such 
as exists when a break in the strata crosses 
the charge, and the claimed safety advantages 
of pulsed infusion shotfiring must be considered 
in the light of this knowledge. 
Over the period 1911 - 1957, only 71 
ignitions resulted from shotfiring in coal seams 
have been recorded, compared with 130 following 
shotfiring in rippings (iii). When the 
comparative number of shots fired in coal seams 
and rippings is taken into account, it is found 
that the probability of ignition is ten times 
greater with ripping shots. As already pointed 
out (i) an investigation into many such ignitions 
revealed that in many cases the explosive charge 
was crossed by a break of considerable width, 
and it is in just those situations where pulsed 
infusion shotfiring cannot be applied. Even in 
undercut coal the occurrence of breaks usually 
precludes the use of the method and it is thus 
seen that only in environments already risk -free 
will this method be applicable. 
It must also be mentioned that in a paper 
(x) presented to the Institution of Mining 
Engineers/ 
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Engineers, Tideswell showed that over the period 
1937 -52 the operation of coal cutting caused 
almost as many ignitions as shotfiring, and thus 
presents a hazard in itself of several times that 
which it is designed to prevent. However, firing 
coal off the solid would greatly increase the 
amount of shotfiring necessary and the 
significance of this would be difficult to assess. 
Nevertheless, it does appear that too much 
stress should not be placed on the freedom from 
ignitions resulting from the use of pulsed 
infusion shotfiring, as its application is 
limited to situations in which dangerous 
conditions do not occur. 
(b) Dust and fume suppression. 
Experiments carried out in a joint 
investigation by the National Coal Board and the 
Institution of Mining Engineers (vi) showed that 
in four cases out of six examined, the total 
number of particles in the range 1 - 5 microns 
produced by firing 100 yds. of face in undercut 
coal by pulsed infusion shotfiring was less than 
that produced by orthodox single shot firing. 
Similar comparisons in a different location 
between pulsed infusion and orthodox single shots 
in coal wetted by normal infusion showed that in 
six out of seven cases pulsed infusion firing 
gave lower dust counts per 100 yds. of face 
fired. The reductions observed varied widely, 
ranging up to 82%. It would thus appear that 
the/ 
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the use of this method does reduce the airborne 
dust created by shotfiring. 
(c) Superior spreading action, resulting in 
reduced use of explosives and a greater 
percentage of round coal. 
It is extremely difficult when analysing 
differences produced by changes in methods, to. 
differentiate between short term improvements 
brought about by increased supervision of the 
new method, and any permanent benefits. Thus, 
while limited tests have showed spectacular 
improvements in large coal production, closely 
controlled size analysis of the coal produced by 
pulsed infusion shotfiring in undercut coal 
showed that in two cases an improvement in the 
+6 ", in one case no change, and in two cases 
a deterioration, compared with results obtained 
with conventional single shot firing (vi). It 
would thus appear that no significant difference 
exists in the size analysis of the coal produced 
by pulsed infusion and single shot firing. 
In the same series of tests it was found 
that in four cases out of five the explosives 
consumption per unit of face length was reduced 
by amounts varying from 18 to 33%, and in the 
remaining case was increased by 14%. Should such 
savings be reproduced in large scale operations, 
considerable economic advantages would accrue. 
(d) Stemming on tap. 
Where a large number of shots are being 
fired/ 
126. 
fired, the preparation and transport of sufficient 
suitable stemming material can present problems, 
especially in districts with no local supply 
available. The use of water piped to the coal 
face removes any temptation from the shotfirer to 
use unsuitable materials. 
The disadvantages of pulsed infusion shot- 
:firing, which have so far severely limited the 
extension of the method are: - 
(a) Inconvenience. 
The inconvenience of working with a hose 
and flowmeter /pressure gauge can be considerable, 
especially in thin seams. In addition, special 
arrangements must be made to ensure that only 
the correct explosive gets to the faces where 
pulsed infusion firing is in use. 
(b) Applicability. 
The great bulk of output from British coal 
mines is still won by hand filling of machine 
cut faces and only in exceptional cases can 
pulsed infusion shotfiring be applied in these 
circumstances. Reference to Table XVII shows 
that only 2% of all shots in 1958 were fired with 
this method, and it would appear that any further 
increase will be restricted to special applications 
such as the preparation of stable holes on power 
loading faces. Even then, the method cannot be 
used in very hard coals, as the gun may be 
ejected from the shotholes with considerable 
violence if the coal does not break and afford 
some/ 
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some release of the high pressure impulse on 
detonation. 
2. Off -shift firing. 
As indicated in section (a) of this Chapter, 
the standard practice in this country is for the 
shots necessary to prepare the coal for hand 
loading to be fired on the production shift. In 
certain districts, however, some or all of the 
shots may be fired on the second preparatory 
shift, and this method, generally called off - 
shift firing, offers obvious potential advantages 
over the normal method. To gain some experience 
of the system two collieries in the Central East 
Area of the Scottish Division were visited for 
one week each, and the following impressions 
gained. 
Colliery A was a small naked light mine 
approaching the end of its useful life and 
working mainly small areas of coal between 
faults. On the face visited the method of work 
was longwall advancing, but the total length of 
face was only 70 yds. No conveyors were used, 
as five roads were carried to the face, and 
the coal after being flung down the face was 
loaded directly into tubs which were then marshalled 
at the haulage road. The seam, three feet thick, 
was undercut to a depth of four feet six inches, 
and the gummer fitted to the machine effectively 
cleaned the cut to the back, giving three or 
four inches clear between the coal and the few 
remaining/ 
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remaining cuttings. Support was by wooden bars 
and props and packs at each side of the roads. 
The cycle of work was orthodox, being, 
Production shift - coal stripping 
First preparatory shift - ripping, pack 
building, hole 
boring. 
Second preparatory shift - coal cutting. 
The cutter men were naturally finished early 
in the shift, and shotfiring did not start till 
they had left the face. As the shotfirer was 
normally the only man in the section, he erected_ 
notices in the approaches to the face. The 
actual procedure was not above criticism but in 
effect the shots were stemmed and fired in 
succession along the face, and the coal was 
effectively prepared for hand loading. The 
deputy on the production shift carried a few 
detonators, but there was rarely any need for 
additional shots. 
At colliery B, a safety lamp mine, the method 
of work was orthodox longwall advancing in a six 
foot seam, with conventional conveying of the coal 
to the loader gate. The 100 yds. long face was 
undercut to a depth of four feet nine inches. 
Support was by steel props and bars, with packs 
and chocks at the waste edge. The cycle of 
operations was: 
Production shift - coal stripping. 





Second preparatory shift - coal cutting, hole 
boring. 
The shotfirer went on to the face halfway through 
the Second Preparatory Shift, and this gave the 
cutter men and hole borer time to get well clear 
before shotfiring started. The coal tended to 
heave in large blocks away from the face and 
required relatively little preparation with 
explosives, only 30 - 40 shots being fired over 
the complete length. The machine was not 
fitted with a Bummer and the impression gained 
was that the shots were fired virtually on the 
solid. Nevertheless, effective results were 
obtained in the easy conditions. Again, the 
shotfiring operations were not above criticism 
but again it was difficult to visualise 
circumstances in which an accident could occur 
to anyone other than the shotfirer. 
Advantages of off -shift firing. 
1. Undoubtedly the main advantage is the 
reduction in risk of an accident occurring should 
material be projected fr an the shot or shots, as 
the number of men who could be injured is 
reduced to one or two, compared with up to ten 
or more when shotfiring takes place on the 
production shift. Obviously, for an accident to 
occur debris from a shot must hit a man, and as 
it is impossible in normal working to eliminate 
the projected material, it is desirable to 
reduce as far as possible the number of men that 
the/ 
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the material can injure. 
2. When shots are fired on the production 
shift, the time spent by facemen taking shelter 
is considerable and the constant repetition of 
this at short intervals can lead to carelessness. 
This danger is eliminated with off -shift firing. 
3. The shotfirer is completely free to 
exercise his own judgment with regard to the 
charge to be employed. While it is true to say 
that this also applies on conventionally fired 
faces, it is likely that continued demands from 
the strippers for increased charges will have 
some effect. 
4, Any fumes or dust created by shotfiring are 
dispersed harmlessly at a time when the least 
inconvenience is caused. Normally, few men are 
employed near the coal face on the second 
preparatory shift. 
It was thought that at colliery A this was 
one of the main reasons for the use of off -shift 
firing, as the rather sluggish face ventilation 
did not clear the fumes from the shots and fuses 
for a considerable time after firing. 
5. The shotfirer can work at a uniform speed 
throughout the shift. When the conventional 
methods of firing are adopted there is a marked 
tendency for shotfiring to be concentrated in 
short periods throughout the shift (Chapter VIII). 
This is inevitable as men working at approximately 
the same speed will always be ready for shots at 
approximately/ 
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approximately the same time, and this can lead 
to great haste and skimped precautions. The 
use of off -shift firing does not, of course, 
guarantee that the provisions of the Regulations 
will be observed, but certainly removes at least 
one of the causes for such infringements. 
Disadvantages of off -shift firing. 
1. Working alone, normally without supervision, 
it is possible that the shotfirer may become 
careless and slipshod in his work. The influence 
of this factor could only be assessed after long. 
experience with the method, but in the two 
collieries visited the standard of practice did 
not seem to be markedly different from that 
observed on conventionally fired faces. 
2. After a shot has been fired, it is 
frequently difficult to tell to what extent the 
burden of the neighbouring hole has been 
relieved. This tends to lead to every hole 
bored being charged, even though this may not be 
strictly necessary. 
3. Limitation of application because of roof 
control problems. It is obvious that this 
method can never be of universal application, as 
many roofs would not be capable of staying 
unsupported for the necessary period - 
approximately four to six hours. The importance 
of this is difficult to assess and only an 
actual trial would prove the feasibility of the 
method/ 
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method in doubtful situations. At colliery B, 
the roof conditions were not good, and in fact a 
trial of a power loading machine working in 
conjunction with a prop -free front method of 
support had recently been abandoned because of 
the failure of the system to give effective 
roof control. 
Should full face off -shift firing not be 
possible, the shotfirer could work across two 
shifts, firing half of the shots on the second 
preparatory shift and the remainder on the 
production shift. If more than one shotfirer is 
required the problem is eased, and cross -shift 
working would not be required. 
If roof conditions proved difficult, an 
additional prop could be erected at the face end 
of the bars after the cutter had passed, and this 
would reduce the distance from the last row of 
props to the beginning of the solid coal by 
approximately two feet, or from six feet six 
to four feet six with a normal four feet six 
inches undercut. 
'3. The use of conventional explosives in 
conjunction with non -inflammable plastic water 
filled bags (water ampoules). 
The idea of using water in conjunction with 
an explosive charge to obtain effective dust 
suppression of seams too hard to be infused by 
normal methods was developed by Demelenne in 
Belgium (xi). In his method, the amount of 
explosive/ 
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explosive used was not sufficient to produce 
displacement of the coal, but recently interest 
in this country has been revived in this work, 
and the water is now incorporated in non - 
inflammable plastic bags, each holding approxi- 
mately 250 mis. of water as part of the 
stemming in normal shotfiring operations. Many 
advantages have been claimed for this method 
and are detailed below. 
(a) Reduced possibility of ignitions from 
shotfiring. 
As already pointed out, the Royal Couuuission 
on Accidents in Mines in 1886 reported that all 
detonating explosives were safe if used in 
conjunction with a water cartridge or porous 
stemming, even if the shot blew out in the 
presence of methane /air mixtures, and it would 
seem reasonable that similar protection would 
be afforded by the use of water ampoules. Tests 
carried out in the explosives testing gallery 
at the S.M.R.E. (xii) with a non -permitted 
explosive, showed that the inclusion of 600 mis. 
of water in the cannon bore, raised the charge 
limit for inverse initiation from 8 to 24 
ounces and thus effected a considerable increase 
in safety. The exact significance of any improve- 
ment as measured in the blown out shot test is 
impossible to correlate to firing in breaks, as in 
the latter case the water is not interposed 
between/ 
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between the explosive and the inflammable 
atmosphere. It would, however, appear that 
some increase in safety would result. In 
addition, this method may be applied in any 
situation, and is not limited,as is the case 
with pulsed infusion shotfiring, by the nature 
of the shothole. 
(b) Reduced transport of stemming material. 
The water ampoules may easily be carried 
in considerable numbers and filled with water 
at some suitable place near the face. In 
practice, it is rather difficult to make a 
watertight knot in the neck of the ampoule, 
especially in underground conditions, and this 
leads to a comparatively high loss of water on 
the face. Nevertheless, the reduction in the 
need to transport orthodox stemming may be a 
considerable advantage in certain districts 
where suitable material is not readily available. 
(c) Reduction in dust produced on shotfiring. 
As mentioned above, this method of using 
explosives in conjunction with limited volumes 
of water was developed to aid the suppression of 
airborne dust, and Demelenne recorded reductions 
of up to 40% in concentrations in coal winning 
operations subsequent to this method being applied. 
In this country, tests carried out by the N.C.B. 
Scientific Department (unpublished) show widely 
fluctuating results for shots in coal seams, but 
general agreement in the reduction in airborne 
dust/ 
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dust observed with ripping shots, the average 
being about 40% and the maximum about 80%. Such 
startling reductions with the volumes of water 
used (200 to 300 mis.) are indeed remarkable and 
would seem to imply that the bulk of the dust 
produced by shotfiring operations in rippings 
comes from the immediate vicinity of the 
explosive charge, as the water obviously cannot 
act as a spray over the complete pile of debris 
produced. This would also account for the wide 
variations shown in coal shots, as variations in 
the nature of the seam may cause it to break into 
large blocks or crumble up easily, thus producing 
dust in places remote from the shothole. 
Whatever the fundamental reasons, it is 
clear that the practical reductions in airborne 
dust counts achieved in ripping shots makes the 
widespread adoption of water ampoules in these 
situations very desirable, and where good results 
are achieved in coal seams, they should also be 
introduced. 
(d) Improvement in the size analysis of the 
coal product. 
As mentioned already on the section on 
pulsed infusion shotfiring, very closely 
controlled tests by independent observers are 
necessary to distinguish between temporary 
improvements brought about by increased super- 
:vision of a new method, and permanent 
improvements due to the method itself. The tests 
of/ 
of which the results were seen did not satisfy 
this requirement and no figures are included here 
for this reason. It is difficult to see what 
improvement can be effected with a volume of 
water of 200 - 300 mis. when pulsed infusion 
shotfiring with the shothole completely filled 
with water did not make any sensible difference 
to the size analysis of the product. 
Two interesting points came to light which 
serve to illustrate the point of increased 
supervision producing temporary improvement. 
When a colliery in the East Midlands Division 
introduced pulsed infusion shotfiring in undercut 
coal, one of the advantages claimed was the 
elimination of the need for additional shots to 
bring down coal sticking after the main shots. 
Two years later, exactly the same advantage 
was claimed for water ampoules in conjunction with 
conventional explosives in comparison with pulsed 
infusion shotfiring. 
Again, in tests made to determine any 
change in size analysis of the product prepared 
by conventional blasting with and without water 
ampoules, it is invariably seen from the results 
that the average weight of charge is reduced when 
ampoules are used. Obviously, increased 
production of large coal is a corollary of 
reduced explosives consumption, but it is 
difficult to see how the average shotfirer could 




charges. It would appear more than possible 
that the increased attention which is given to 
new methods in the trial stages would account for 
the improvements observed with this method, but 
only continued experience will show if this is 
so. 
Conclusions 
(1) Single shot firing with conventional 
explosives and methods is still the most widely 
practised method in this country, accounting 
for 70% of all shots fired in coal. Simultaneous 
firing in rounds of up to six shots represents 
20% of the remainder and the application of this 
method is limited in hand loaded faces by the 
limited speed at which the coal may be removed 
and supports set. 
(2) Alternatives to explosives offer potential 
safety and economic advantages over conventional 
explosives, and are likely to become more 
popular in suitable situations. 
(3) The application of pulsed infusion 
shotfiring is limited, and this method is likely 
to be used mainly in small scale operations, 
such as the preparation of stable holes on power - 
loaded faces. 
(Lt) Off shift firing offers great potential 
advantages over the conventional method of firing 
shots on the production shift. 
(5)/ 
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(5) The use of water ampoules in conjunction 
with conventional explosives may, in certain 
circumstances, considerably reduce the dust 
produced by shotfiring. 
(i) 
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SHOTFIRING IN RIPPINGS 
140. 
The creation of roads sufficiently large to 
satisfy ventilation and haulage requirements in 
longwall work necessitates, in all except the 
thickest seams, the removal of part of the 
strata from above or below the coal seam. The 
importance of this operation is demonstrated by 
Table XVI, page 83, which shows that in 1958 
in N.C.B. mines 14.734 million shots were 
required in these situations and of these, 96% 
were initiated singly, simultaneously in rounds 
of up to six shots or by fuse. The firing of 
these shots is governed by the same Regulations 
applying to shots in coal, and the only 
additional provision imposes an obligation on 
the shotfirer to use sheathed or equivalent to 
sheathed explosives in roof rippings within 60 ft. 
of the coal face in mines in any part of which 
the use of lights other than permitted lights is 
unlawful, or in any part of a mine in which 
safety lamps are being used as a temporary 
precaution. Alternatives to explosives offer 
undoubted safety advantages for ripping shots, 
being free from any danger of igniting methane/ 
air mixtures, but the application of these 
devices is limited by the range of materials in 
which effective blasting and fragmentation may 
be obtained. 
Ripping shots have a much greater potential 
ignition hazard (i) than do shots in coal, due 
primarily to the inevitable bed separation in 
the/ 
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the strata overlying the coal seam creating 
breaks which may cross the explosive charge and 
also communicate with accumulations of methane. 
This problem may be overcome in three ways - by 
the temporary or permanent elimination of the 
dangerous conditions or by the development of an 
explosive which would be completely safe when 
used in quantities sufficient for any ripping 
blasting needs. The elimination of the 
dangerous conditions presents an almost insoluble 
problem in orthodox: longwall working, as the 
time interval between the removal of the coal 
and overlying strata inevitably leads to bed 
separation taking place. However, this may be 
overcome in three ways, namely, the use of 
longwall retreating methods where no ripping is 
normally necessary, the use of headings driven a 
short distance ahead of the coal face, or the 
ripping of the floor instead of the roof. 
Blasting material upwards is wasteful of 
explosives in comparison with blowing it down. 
The three methods involve difficulties in 
application, but they have nevertheless been 
used, generally for reasons other than the 
ignition hazard on shotfiring, and are all thus 
feasible in practice. 
The treatment of the dangerous conditions 
to obtain temporary relief offers an attractive 
solution to the problem, as it could be applied 
without an alteration of existing conventional 
methods/ 
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methods of work. However, there is always the 
chance that the essential precautions might be 
neglected just when it was most required, and 
this must be considered a grave disadvantage of 
the method. Efforts in this direction have been 
concentrated by the Safety in Mines Research 
Establishment into the development and injection 
of a suitable foam into the shotholes, thus 
driving any inflammable gases to places remote 
from the explosive charge. Experimental results 
(ii) have shown increases in safety in the 
break gallery test, and limited underground 
trials have been performed. The use of water 
ampoules also offers a ready means of including 
water virtually in contact with the explosive 
charge, but the probable influence of this in 
practical conditions is difficult to assess. 
The development of an explosive which would 
be incapable of igniting methane /air mixtures 
under practical conditions offers the most 
attractive solution, as it would be foolproof 
and not interfere with conventional methods of 
work. Generally, however, increase in safety 
involves reduction in power and this may impose 
limitations on the applicability of very low 
strength explosives in hard rock rippings which 
are those most likely to give rise to extensive 
breaks (i). 
The development of delay detonators for 
use in stone mines offered possibilities for 
increasing/ 
increasing the efficiency of blasting operations 
in thick rippings. Where holes are required on 
more than one horizon, they must generally be 
fired in separate rounds to achieve economic 
blasting without the formation of sockets in the 
upper holes, and this repetition of operations 
could be eliminated by the use of delay 
detonators. Shots in rippings are, however, 
much more likely to give rise to ignitions than 
shots in stone mines, and at present work is 
concentrated on attempting to estimate the 
possible additional hazards introduced 
specifically by delay blasting, and should these 
prove to be less serious than at first supposed, 
the technique may become more widespread. 
The dangers arise from the possibility of 
ignition of methane or coal dust by the 
detonators and the explosive charge used, and are 
dealt with in great detail in a paper presented 
by Grimshaw to the Institution of Mining Engineers 
- 'The Possible Applications of Short Period 
Delay Detonators in Safety Lamp Mines' (iii). 
Briefly, however, they concern the incendivity 
of the detonators when fired unconfined in 
methane /air mixtures and the possibility of an 
early shot in a round removing part of the burden 
if a later shot, resulting in the latter firing 
while exposed or partially confined. Few 
explosives offer high margins of safety in the 




could occur only if a body of methane were 
released by an earlier shot, it is obviously 
undesirable to introduce any new hazard, 
however small. 
In addition, the method would at present 
be limited to rippings which could be blasted by 
up to six shots - the capacity of the largest 
approved (Type P) exploder - and in these 
circumstances it is doubtful if the operational 
advantages gained would outweigh the effort 
entailed in training shotfirers and arranging 
for the issue of delay detonators for the limited 
number of shots fired. Should a larger 
capacity exploder become available, however, the 
method may find increasing use in the limited 
numbers of rippings requiring several rows of 
holes. 
The problem of the reduction in accidents 
due to projected material from ripping shots 
should be more amenable to investigation than 
shots in coal, as the shotfiring operations are 
generally concentrated both in space and time. 
However, as indicated in Chapter IV, there is a 
certain amount of evidence to suggest that these 
shots present a disproportionately high hazard, 
suggesting that the location and direction of the 
shotholes may be of overriding importance, when 




(1) Over 96% of all shots in rippings are 
fired with conventional explosives initiated by 
instantaneous detonators fired singly, 
simultaneously in rounds of up to six shots or 
by fuse. 
(2) Alternatives to explosives are employed 
only to a limited extent in rippings, probably 
because of the difficulty in obtaining effective 
fragmentation of hard strata with these devices. 
(3) Delay firing is used to a small extent, 
and the extension of this technique in rippings 
will be influenced by the development of a 
suitable exploder of 12 - 15 shots capacity, the 
number of rippings which require shots on 
several horizons, and the inconvenience of the 
additional training of shotfirers and issue of 
delay detonators for the comparatively small 
number of shots fired. 
(4) The complete elimination of ignitions 
resulting from shotfiring in rippings can be 
achieved only on the development of a completely 
safe explosive, but the use of methods of work 
which do not allow bed separation to take place 
before firing could provide a means of reducing 
the hazard in especially dangerous situations. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SHOTFIRING IN STONE MINES 
11+7. 
148. 
The recent introduction of horizon mining 
into this country has necessitated the drivage 
of much longer roads through solid rock strata 
than was necessary with the traditional 'in the 
seam' methods formerly employed, and in 1958 
in N.C.B. mines 5.614 million shots or 6% of the 
annual total were fired in these situations. 
As the shotfiring operations are very localised 
in comparison with coal and ripping blasting, 
they form a suitable subject for specialist 
study and have in fact been highly developed to 
increase the overall speed of stone mine 
drivages. 
The problems encountered in the blasting 
operations are almost purely technical and thus 
outwith the scope of this work but certain 
general principles may be stated. The rock 
strata is not cut or sheared,but the initial 
shots are located and loaded to provide an 
additional free face to which other shots may 
blow. Shots are then fired in groups 
successively further from the free face until 
the required tunnel shape has been formed. 
The development of half- second and millisecond 
delay detonators has enabled all the shots to 
be charged, stemmed_ and fired at once, effecting 
considerable savings in the time taken by 
shotfiring operations and speeding up the overall 
drivage rate obtained. When large numbers of 
shots/ 
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shots are initiated simultaneously a Type N 
exploder, unapproved for general use underground, 
must be used and the conditions attached to the 
exemptions given must be rigidly observed if 
safety is to be ensured. In 1957, two 
explosions in stone mines (i) were attributed to 
incendive sparking at defective cable joints 
when a high capacity dynamo condenser exploder 
was in use, coupled with the existence of 
considerable undetected concentrations of methane 
existing at the roof of the tunnels. 
The incidence of shotfiring accidents in 
stone mines is not high (Table XVII) due 
probably to the unusually favourable circumstances 
in these situations. The concentration of 
shotfiring with the extensive use of delay 
blasting results in a reduction in exposure to 
risk and a correspondingly reduced temptation to 
neglect the precaution of taking cover, and the 
single means of access to the shots eliminates 
any dependence on sentries, as the shotfirer will 
normally perform this duty himself. 
(i) 
R E F E R E N C E S 
Explosion at Golborne Colliery, Lanca- 
shire - Report by G. Hoyle, C.M.G., 
H. M. Divisional Inspector of Mines 
and Quarries 
Explosion at Risehow Colliery, 
Cumberland - Report by H. Hyde, H. M. 





THE CAUSES OF SHOTFIRING ACCIDENTS 
In Chapter I, it was shown that all shotfiring 
accidents could be divided into two classes, 
namely, those which could be attributed to some 
failure of the explosive or ancillary equipment 
to attain technical perfection, and those due to 
failure of the human element. The elimination 
of the former class is a purely technical 
problem and the current indication, shown on 
Graphs I and II, is that a considerable measure 
of success has been achieved in this field. 
The latter class of accident, which is shown by 
Graph II to form a very large and increasing 
percentage of the total, may be further sub- 
divided into those in which a breach of the 
Regulations was the main contributory cause and 
those in which the shotfirer, through a faulty 
estimation of all the factors involved, failed 
to ensure that everything was safe for the firing 
of the shot or shots. However, this subdivision 
cannot be carried out with any reasonable certainty 
or accuracy as accidents may result from a 
combination of factors and the influence of each 
will be impossible to determine. It is 
convenient, however, to treat such accidents as 
being due to one or other of the two causes, and 
the subdivision including accidents due to 
breaches of the Regulations are considered first. 
At the present time any person firing shots 
in collieries where permitted explosives only 
may be used must have 
(a)/ 
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(a) a gas testing certificate obtained within 
the previous five years, 
(b) a shotfirer's certificate, granted by the 
Ministry of Power on the recommendation 
of the Mining Qualifications Board and 
spent not less than five shifts in 
practising shotfiring in a mine under 
the close personal supervision of a 
shotfirer, or 
a First or Second Class Certificate of 
Competency, or 
held a service certificate under 
Paragraph 6 of Article 12 of the 1951 
Explosives in Coal Mines Order, stating 
that he regularly fired shots in a mine 
to which Part II of the 1934 Explosives 
in Coal Mines Order applied, 
(c) attained the age of twenty -two years, or 
twenty -one years if he holds a General 
Certificate in Mining or higher 
qualification, and, 
(d) had three years underground experience 
with not less than eighteen months at 
the coal face, with not more than six 
months in stone mine drivages. 
Although anyone may sit the Shotfirers' 
Examination, it is now usual for whole time 
residential or part -time evening classes to be 
organised and these deal in great detail with 
the requirements of the Regulations. The final 
examination ensures that all who pass have a 
sound working knowledge of their duties and 
obligations and it is impossible that any 
shotfirer breaking the law does so unwittingly. 
Nevertheless/ 
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Nevertheless accidents caused by breaches of the 
Regulations continue to occur, and it is clear 
that some reason unconnected with faulty 
training must exist. 
Throughout the period of study, ample 
opportunity has been afforded by visits to 
collieries in different Areas and Divisions to 
observe the standard of practice achieved in 
shotfiring. Even when there was no rush of work, 
in no case seen did a shotfirer carry out the 
provisions of the Regulations in full, and 
frequently the faults of omission or commission 
were such as to be conducive to accidents. The 
most common breaches observed were laxity in gas 
testing procedure, the firing of more than one 
shot with a single shot exploder, the use of very 
.small quantities of stemming, the firing of shots 
wholly or partially in solid coal and the 
charging and stemming of several shots when 
single shot firing was in use. Frequently 
any attempt at break detection was purely token. 
One very marked feature was the stress laid on 
different operations at different collieries. 
Thus at one pit the shotfirer did not take his 
flame safety lamp on to the face but would not 
fire any shot unless the undercut was properly 
gummed, while at another this was reversed, with 
gas testing being carried out before shots were 
fired in the solid coal. 
However/ 
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However, undoubtedly the most disturbing 
feature observed was that the malpractices went 
on with the silent approval, and sometimes active 
encouragement, of the section oversman and deputy. 
While it is obvious that only a sense of 
responsibility in the shotfirer himself can ensure 
that all the necessary operations are carried out 
for every shot, it is equally clear that some 
supervision must be imposed. No uniform policy 
exists throughout the National Coal Board but 
Explosives Engineers, concerned mainly with the 
economic aspects of shotfiring, have been appointed 
in certain Divisions and at Area and pit levels 
Large -coal Officers and Safety Officers include 
the supervision of shotfiring practice in their 
duties. It is obvious that any control 
exercised by those officials can have only a 
limited effect, as any section visited will 
probably be forewarned. 
The committee on the precautions necessary 
to ensure safety in the use of explosives in coal 
mines (i) suggested that the employment of a 
specialist oversman, who would concern himself 
solely with the use and handling of explosives, 
would yield worthwhile safety advantages by 
imposing closer control on shotfiring practice. 
It has been repeatedly shown by the technical 
representatives of explosives manufacturers (iv) 
that increased supervision of shotfiring operation 
results in considerable reductions in explosives 
consumption/ 
156, 
consumption and increases in the percentage of 
round coal obtained. Unfortunately, these 
improvements are lost when the control is removed. 
It must be stressed that the economic and safety 
requirements of shotfiring are very similar, and 
that although debris may be projected from any 
shot the possibility is increased should the hole 
be overcharged, understemmed or badly placed. 
These factors also lead to degradation of the 
product and high explosives consumption. 
Undoubtedly the appointment of an 'explosives 
oversman' at colliery level to supervise shot - 
:firing would help to eliminate these (and other) 
malpractices, and bring about an attendant 
reduction in the accident hazard. 
In circumstances where the method of work 
adopted by the management results in the work of 
shotfiring being unevenly distributed throughout 
the shift, the problem becomes very much more 
complicated and it is then not possible to place 
the blame for failure to observe the provisions 
of the Regulations solely on the shotfirer and 
other section officials. The requirements 
relating to the firing of single shots are very 
comprehensive and it is obvious that the fulfil- 
ment of them all must take a considerable time. 
No previous record of a time test could be found 
and it was decided that to obtain a measure of 
the difference (if any) existing between rates of 
shotfiring achieved in practice and allowed 
in theory from consideration/ 
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consideration of the results of the time test, 
a series of observations would be taken at an 
orthodox hand filled longwall face. 
The conditions were felt to offer a 
reasonable compromise, without being excessively 
easy or difficult. The working height of the 
seam was four feet six inches and the full dip 
of one in five was along the face line towards 
the main gate. The shotfirer, who held a 
Shotfirer's Certificate (ii) had over ten years 
experience at his job and was fully familiar 
with the requirements of the Regulations. 
Unfortunately, due to the pressure of production 
only two time tests could be carried out, with 
the results given in Table XX. 
This test imposes a maximum, under these 
specific conditions, of approximately five shots 
per hour, if some allowance is made for assistance 
received from face workers in stemming the hole, 
removing tools, etc. 
The second part of the work consisted of 
taking a note of the time at which every shot 
was fired, for four successive production 
shifts. From the average time intervals 
between the shots the corresponding rate of 
shots per hour was calculated (Tables XXI - 
XXIV) and plotted against the time throughout 
the shift (Graphs XXVIII - XXI). The plots 
obtained show, as might be expected, a marked 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLES XXI - XXIV 
The times of firing shots throughout four 
successive shifts on a longwall face, the interval 
between shots, the average intervals between 
shots and the corresponding rate of firing in 
shots per hour. 


















8.10 20 3 
10 
8.20 10 6 
10 
8.30 172 3.4 
25 
8.55 172 3.4 
10 
9.05 10 6 
10 






10.20 20 3 
10 
10.30 72 8 
5 
10.35 62 9.3 
8 
10.43 62 9.3 
5 
10.48 7 8.5 
9 
10.57 82 7 
8 
11.05 162 3.6 
25 
11.30 16 3.6 
7 
11.37 7 8.5 
7 
11.44 21 2.8 
36 
12.20 28 2.2 
20 
12.40 






















10.l4.0 10 6 
5 
10.45 72 8 
10 
10.55 82 7 
7 
11.02 6 10 
5 
11.07 162 3.6 
28 
11.35 162 3.6 
5 
11.40 5 12 
5 
11.45 5 12 
5 
























































































































































10.48 6i 9.3 
7 
10.55 13 4.6 
19 
11.14 182 3.2 
18 

























































































































































































































































































































































and after piece time, except on the second day 
when a plant breakdown interfered with the normal 
working of the section. The Graphs reflect the 
method of work in the section, whereby the 
shotfirer worked his way down the group of men 
he served firing breaking -in shots in each place. 
After an interval of comparative quiet while the 
coal prepared by these shots was filled out, the 
journey was repeated and another shot or shots was 
fired for each man. The pattern is again 
revealed after piece time with two high peak 
values being shown. 
Obviously, it is impossible that the work of 
shotfiring can ever be evenly distributed through - 
:out the shift, but the disparity between the 
observed and calculated firing rates is extremely 
disturbing. Reference to the Tables and Graphs 
shows that several shots were fired after a time 
interval of five minutes from the preceding shot, 
allowing only the essentials of charging and 
stemming of the shot to be carried out without 
any precautionary examinations. In addition, it 
should be noted that a temporary change in the nature 
of the coal in the section had resulted in only 
20 - 25 shots being fired by each shotfirer, and 
a return to normal conditions would probably 




Although these tests could not be repeated 
on other faces the same feature of alternately 
high and low shotfiring rates was observed, and 
it is difficult to see how this could be 
eliminated when normal shotfiring practice is 
adopted on orthodox hand filled longwall faces. 
Obviously, men working at approximately the 
same speed on similar tasks must be ready for 
shots at approximately the same time. While 
similar tests would have to be carried out on 
every face on which an acciäent occurred to 
establish a relationship between 'rush periods' 
and the occurrence of accidents, it is inevitable 
that the circumstances requiring such haste must 
predispose the face personnel to neglect the 
essential precaution of taking cover. This must 
be considered an inherent disadvantage of orthodox 
longwall working and as long as human nature 
remains unchanged accidents resulting from this 
cause will never be eliminated. The use of 
alternatives to explosives, permitting high 
shotfiring rates to be legally maintained, 
(Chapter V), offers a palliative to the problem, 
and the introduction of off -shift firing, where 
applicable, would provide a complete solution. 
Although the great majority of accidents are 
caused by projected material striking people in 
shelter shown by the occurrence of the accident 
to have been inadequate, a small number are 
caused each year by a misunderstanding between 
the/ 
166. 
the shotfirer and the sentry, or the sentry 
failing to stop someone walking towards the shot, 
in each case resulting in someone being at or 
near the shot when it goes off. In certain 
collieries the shotfirer is provided with a red 
plastic disc which he fits over the sentry's 
cap lamp and this serves to remind him constantly 
of his duties. Even should this fail to have 
the desired effect it is unlikely that anyone 
would walk past without seeing the disc and 
enquiring into the reason for it. There seems 
to be no good reason why this practice could not 
be extended to all collieries with a consequent 
elimination, or at least reduction, in one of 
the hazards of shotfiring. 
Although breaches of the Regulations take 
place when virtually every shot if fired, these 
may not be the main or even a contributing 
cause when an accident occurs, and the Chief 
Inspector of Mines and Quarries in his annual 
report for 1958 stated that 'most of the 
(shotfiring) accidents which occurred during the 
year were caused by blows from projected material 
in circumstances where there had been an error of 
judgment in determining the danger zone of the 
shot or where persons had not withdrawn to proper 
shelter'. While the occurrence of an accident 
obviously shows that an error of judgment has 
occurred, it is felt that the statement above 
rather evades the basic problem - the difficulty in 
many/ 
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many situations of finding any suitable cover. 
The actual wording of the Regulations 
relating to the taking of shelter is: 
(1) Any shotfirer proposing to fire a shot 
shall before firing determine the danger 
zone likely to be created. 
(2) No shotfirer shall fire any shot unless 
he has: 
(a) at each entry to the danger zone 
posted a sentry or placed an appropriate 
fence conspicuously marked with the words 
'danger' and 'shotfiring'; 
(b) ensured that all persons have 
withdrawn from that zone or have taken 
proper shelter; and 
(c) himself taken proper shelter. 
Obviously, when explosives are in use, any 
energy in excess of that required to dislodge 
and partially break up the material being 
blasted must be dissipated at least in part in 
the degradation and projection of coal or stone. 
In exceptional cases the energy may be concen- 
trated on a small mass of stemming and coal or 
stone and this may be blown with great force 
over considerable distances. Reference to 
Figure III illustrates the difficulty that a 
shotfirer must face in attempting to ensure 
that everyone is in shelter or outwith the 
danger zone when shots are fired on a longwall 
face. For breaking -in shots of Type A the 
only possible way in which solid cover may be 
interposed between the shot and the face 
personnel/ 
168 
FIGURE I I I 
PLAN OF PART OF A LONGWALL FACE SHOWING THE 
LOCATION AND DIRECTION OF THE SHOTHOLES FOR 
A - BREAKING -IN SHOT 
B - INTERMEDIATE SHOT 
C - SHOT OPPOSITE THE ROADHEAD 
D - SHOT IN THE CORNER OF THE FACE 
E - SHOT IN THE RIPPING 
169. 
personnel is for the latter to retreat doom the 
roads to the face, and this rapidly becomes 
impracticable as the shotfirer works towards the 
middle of the face. It is of course true that, 
because of the constraining action of the coal 
on either side of the shot, any debris 
projected will tend to blow into the pack or 
waste opposite,but the remote possibility of a 
ricochet being deflected at an acute angle up or 
doom the face must always remain. 
Shots of Type B are required after the coal 
prepared by the breaking -in shot has been cleared. 
As indicated in Chapter V, the hole placement 
may not be ideal and the burden may be very 
unbalanced - obviously circumstances which 
could lead to the projection of material. The 
necessity for such shots does, however, imply 
that a similar pillar of coal will be available 
elsewhere on the face behind which shelter may be 
taken, but care is necessary in getting well 
behind the coal buttock to prevent the 
possibility of a ricochet causing an accident. 
For shots of Type C, opposite the roadhead, 
or ripping shots (E), a dangerous situation 
arises. If the road is used for coal transport 
several men will be working in it and all will 
be exposed to the risk of an accident. While 
it is widely appreciated that distance alone 
gives protection from these shots only when the 
separation between man and shots is carried to 
impracticable/ 
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impracticable extremes, there is an unfortunate 
tendency for men to be satisfied with shelter 
of very doubtful efficiency, and the very large 
numbers of shots fired will inevitably result in 
the gaps in poor quality protection being found 
by projected material. 
In the corners of the face, shots of Type D, 
with the holes bored at an angle as shown, must 
generally be fired and these, being at least in 
part over solid coal with a second free face 
provided by the removal of the neighbouring coal, 
are naturally heavily charged. Because of the 
shothole placing and direction, any material 
projected may ricochet either out the road or up 
the face, and as most of the coal will normally 
have been cleared when these shots are fired, 
there will be little shelter available on the 
face. 
Thus the problem of ensuring that everyone 
is in proper shelter or outwith the danger zone 
when shots are fired in coal on longwall faces is 
by no means easy, as there is little shelter on the 
face and that available in the roads may not be 
suitable. In fact, considering the amount of 
cover which can be utilised, the accident rate of 
approximately one per 300,000 shots can only be 
considered as remarkably low. 
The use of shelters offers a possible means 
of reducing this hazard, by introducing 
additional protection capable of deflecting or 
stopping/ 
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stopping projected material. All such devices 
fall into two main categories - those which 
provide limited protection for a complete area 
by occupying the entire cross -sectional area 
between the shot and the personnel, and those 
which give complete protection for a much more 
limited area, by means of a solid shield close 
enough to the personnel to prevent the 
possibility of any ricochet being deflected to 
hit them. The first type are, by their nature, 
restricted in use to circumstances where 
comparatively settled conditions exist, and to 
prevent undue restriction of the ventilation, 
they must be made of material with a large 
number of openings, albeit of small dimensions. 
For these reasons they are used only in roads 
leading to the face, and are constructed as 
curtains so that the lower portions may be drawn 
to the side when not required (iii). Obviously 
these devices cannot give complete protection 
and can be considered only as an added safeguard 
to more solid types of shelters. Shotfiring 
shelters of the second type may be made of any 
material available at the colliery or in the 
section, and old conveyor belting or wooden 
boards, with or without metal reinforcement, 
are frequently used. The design normally 
allows the structure to be folded away when 
not in use. 
When/ 
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When considering the undoubted safeguards 
which the use of shotfiring shelters will bring 
when properly constructed and used, it is 
essential to bear in mind certain inherent 
possible disadvantages. One of the 
fundamental maxims in industrial accident 
prevention is that a safety device, to be 
effective, must be outwith the control of the 
workmen, and it is obvious that no shelter can 
ever satisfy this requirement. In the East 
Midlands Division, shotfiring curtains are 
provided in virtually every gate road in 
longwall workings, but in some faces visited 
they were not properly erected and the lower 
sections of netting were lying at the side of 
the gate, obviously out of use, and this would 
certainly seem to bear out the truth of the 
above contention. Nevertheless, if no 
suitable shelter exists the shotfirer is 
obviously placed in a most unsatisfactory 
position and he will be forced to fire shots 
when the legal requirements are not, and cannot 
be, satisfied. However, in roads used for 
coal transport manholes must be made and these, 
if properly constructed, provide complete 
protection. In such circumstances the 
provision of shelters merely duplicates cover 
already existing, and it is difficult to see 
why a shotfirer should go to the trouble of 
erecting a shelter if he will not go into a 
manhole/ 
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manhole. On roads where manholes are not 
required by law, it is unlikely that even the 
most rudimentary cover will exist and in such 
circumstances a much stronger case for the 
provision of shelters can be put forward. 
Nevertheless, the same purpose could be served 
more efficiently by the provision of an 
occasional manhole, as few men will normally 
be working in such roads (either tail gates or 
coal headings) when shotfiring takes place. 
In stone mines shotfiring is now normally 
carried out only once per shift and the 
temptation to skimp the precaution of taking 
cover is correspondingly reduced. When high 
capacity exploders are in use, the exemption 
normally specifies a minimum distance from the 
face to the firing station in itself adequate 
to ensure safety, but again in long stone 
drivages manholes will be provided, giving 
adequate shelter without the need for any 
additional protection. 
Again, shelters to be effective have to be 
strong enough to withstand the most severe 
blow likely to be encountered. Shotfiring 
accidents are exceptional occurrences and it is 
essential to take into account every possible 
contingency when designing shelters. Thus, 
should a heavily charged shot blow out, any 
stones in the stemming material will be capable 
of penetrating shelters adequate for normal 
conditions/ 
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conditions. It has also been suggested that the 
existence of shelters might lead to abuses, 
as a false sense of security created might lead 
to their use too close to the shot being fired. 
Those two factors are not distinct as the distance 
from the shot and the strength of the shelter 
must be to a certain extent interdependent. 
This point is extremely well illustrated by an 
example given in the Annual Report of the Chief 
Inspector of Mines and Quarries for 1958, which 
cites the case of a shotfirer who was killed 
when he fired a ripping shot from behind a 
sheet of corrugated iron thirty -two yards from 
the shothole. The material penetrated the 
sheet with sufficient reserve of energy to 
puncture his heart. 
The combination of the disadvantages of the 
difficulty of making a shelter suitably strong, 
the uncertainty of its use if provided, and the 
possibility of abuse makes it difficult to 
imagine that shotfiring shelters will ever be 
used to any extent on the coal face. The two 
latter disadvantages in particular apply even 
more strongly in this situation than in the more 
pleasant environmental conditions of gate roads. 
Conclusions 
(1) Shotfiring accidents resulting from failure 
of the human element may in theory be divided 
into those in which a breach of the Regulations 
was the main contributory cause, and those due 
primarily/ 
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primarily to errors of judgment. In practice, 
it is generally impossible to estimate the 
significance of the individual factors, as both 
causes may contribute to individual accidents. 
(2) The general standard of shotfiring 
practice is low, and this is due both to apathy 
on the part of the section officials allowing the 
high standard demonstrated and achieved in the 
training period to deteriorate, and the present 
system of orthodox hand filled longwall working 
which prevents the shotfirer from working at an 
even rate throughout the shift. 
(3) In orthodox longwall working it is 
frequently impossible for the shotfirer to 
ensure that everyone is in proper cover prior to 
the firing of the shot. This factor, combined 
with the impossibility of providing suitable 
artificial shelters in the cramped conditions 
on the coal face, would appear to indicate 
that shotfiring accidents will never be 
eliminated when conventional shotfiring practice 
is adopted on orthodox hand filled longwall faces. 
(4) The use of shelters offers considerable 
theoretical advantages but the possibility of 
their non -use or abuse, coupled with the 
difficulty in estimating the strength which is 
required militates against their use in 
practice. The only absolutely safe cover is 
solid rock between the shot and the personnel, 
sufficiently close to the latter to prevent rico- 
chets/ 
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:chets causing accidents, and this is provided 
efficiently by manholes. The provision of 
these even when not legally required would seem 
more desirable than the use of shelters of 
perhaps doubtful efficiency. 
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EXPLANATION OF LOCAL 
ACCIDENT RATE VARIATIONS 
178. 
Chapter IV, dealing with the statistical 
study of the distribution of shotfiring accidents, 
showed that most National Coal Board Divisions 
could be considered average when compared with 
the rest of the country. In other words, most 
of the variations in accident rates which 
occurred could be explained by the fluctuations 
which might be expected in any random 
distribution of numbers. However, two 
Divisions - the Scottish and the North Eastern - 
showed marked divergences from average, Scotland 
being very bad and the North East very good when 
compared with the rest of the country. A 
further analysis of the Scottish Division showed 
that no Area accounted for an excessive 
proportion of the total, but that the Central 
East Area had an indicatively lower accident 
rate than the rest of the Division. Any analysis 
of shotfiring must include an attempt at the 
explanation of these divergences from average 
conditions. 
The general comments of Chapter VIII apply, 
with certain reservations, to all geographic 
areas, and the explanation of indicative or 
significant variations in accident rates must 
lie in differences in working conditions, 
methods of shotfiring and standards of care 
particular to the area considered. Any attempt 
at analysis is difficult as these factors may 
operate/ 
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operate individually or collectively, and the 
same overall position may be achieved in a 
variety of ways. Thus an average accident rate 
may result from the combination of an inherently 
dangerous practice and high standards of care, 
or a safe practice and low standards of workman - 
:ship. This precludes what would otherwise have 
been a simple comparison of the good and bad 
Divisions to determine which controlling factors 
influenced the occurrence of accidents. 
Off -shift firing, and the use of portable 
shelters were shown in Chapter VIII to offer 
possible means of reducing shotfiring accidents 
and, with the co- operation of the National Coal 
Board, a circular was prepared and sent to each 
Division, enquiring into the extent of the use 
of these techniques. The replies are given 
in Table XXV, exactly as received, and the 
comments in the column headed 'Accident Position' 
are derived from consideration of Graphs VIII - 
XVI, pages 66 - 70. The results are in a 
sense disappointing as no absolutely clear cut 
conclusions can be drawn. However, it is at 
once evident that the explanation of the high 
accident rate in Scotland does not lie in the 
very limited use of off -shift firing or non -use 
of portable shelters, as the South West, combined 
West Midlands /South East and North West Divisions 
with average or better than average accident 














The use of Off -shift Firing and Portable Shelters, and dale 
'Off-shift' Shotfiring 
Practiced in one Area out of the eight in Division. 
Quite widely practiced, particularly in East Coast pits where the shotfirer 
and sometimes a few fillers (to clean up the gumm' g ) go on ahead 
main coaling shift and get sometimes as much as three- quarters of the 
shotfiring done. 
Is practised in certain Areas, but the practticce varies considerably 
of where 
ode 
pit to another and reliable figures 
'off- shift' firing is practiced are difficult to obtain. 
Generally speaking, the majority of the face shotfiring takes place two 
hours or so before the filling shift. 
Very limited application. 
'Off- shift' shotfiring is in respect of approximately 10% of total 
operations. 
Practiced at approximately 20% of the collieries, but this figure 
is being 
reduced. 
Only to a limited extent. 
Accident position of the Divisions of the National Coal Board 
Use of Portable Shelters 
Not used. Accident Position 
Very bad Portable shelters have been extensively used in one Area for some time and are Average 
now being introduced on a larger scale into all Areas both for gate roads 
and for drifts. 
The use of portable shelters is increasing almost daily and the the end of Sept., 1959 was that three Areas showed 11 0 position at 
table 
shelters in use where 13, 7 20 collieries respectively 
and 
e 2 were involved. Only a few pits are using portable shelters in gate roads and noneat all in 




Better than averag Portable shelters are used universally in gate roads and in stone drifts where Average limited firing is carried out, i.e, up to 6 shots per round. For heavy firing in large drifts, i.e. rounds up to 50 shots, it is customary for the firing point to be in a roadway different from the one in which the shots 
Ara 
Very limited 




Graph XIV and the comments in the table on the 
East Midlands Division indicates that the 
provision of portable shelters does not appear 
to effect any reduction in shotfiring accidents. 
It should be noticed that the word 'used' in 
the table should be accepted with the 
reservations indicated in Chapter VIII. Only 
one Division, the North Eastern, uses off -shift 
firing for the majority of coal preparation shots 
and this coincides with a significantly low 
accident rate, indicated on Graph XV. It is 
difficult to assess from the reply received 
from Durham the exact extent of the use of 
off -shift firing in that Division. 
In the Scottish Division off -shift firing 
is confined to the Central East Area and this, 
for the rather limited period which could be 
examined, coincides with indicatively low 
accident figures, shown on Graph XVIII. It is 
interesting to note in Table XXVI that in three 
out of the four years examined, the accident rate 
from falls of roof and side at the face, based 
on the tonnage of coal produced was lower in 
the Central East Area than the rest of Scotland 
and that the use of the method does not 
apparently result in dangerous conditions being 
created at the coal face. It must, however, 
be emphasised that the shotfiring accident rate 
in the Central East Area is indicatively low 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































If expectations are calculated from the accident 
rate for the rest of the country, as in Table 
XXVII, and plotted against the observation with 
the usual confidence units superimposed, as in 
Graph XXXII, it is seen that only one year 
falls outside the region of no significance. 
This provides an example of the simultaneous 
operation of two conflicting factors - the 
Area rate being reduced below the Divisional 
average by off -shift firing, and increased to 
the National average by the effect of the 
overall Scottish Divisional influence, considered 
in greater detail below. 
As already mentioned, no explanation for 
the high accident rate in Scotland can be found 
from consideration of the use of off -shift 
firing and portable shelters, and the solution 
must lie in purely local differences in 
conditions, methods of work or standards of 
practice. In Scotland, generally speaking, 
mining conditions are rather worse than the 
rest of the country and thin seams, hard coals, 
faulted ground and high strata inclinations 
are frequently encountered. Thin seams require 
more, although lighter, shots per ton of output 
than do thick seams, and the combination of the 
frequent need to take shelter and the difficulty 
encountered in moving in seams less than two 
feet six inches thick will inevitably lead to 





For each year of the period 1954 -57, the 
observed number of accidents (0) and the number 
of shots fired (N) in the Central East Area of 
the Scottish Division are shown. The National 
totals of shots (T) and accidents (A) are also 
given. Expectations (E) are then calculated 
for the Central East Area, based on the average 
accident rate for the rest of the country, i.e. 
E = N qa, 
Year 0 Nx106 Tx106 A E _N(T_2) 
1951. 8 2.22 95.35 265 6.14 
1955 4 2.28 95.67 272 6.55 
1956 2 2.26 96.92 255 6.05 
1957 8 2.18 95.56 249 5.60 
GRAPH XXXII 
SHOT FI RING ACCIDENTS IN THE CENTRAL EAST AREA 
SCOTTISH DIVISION, 1954 -1957. 
The observed -number of accidents CO] plotted agsi-nit the 
expectation [E] calculated on the basis of the accident Tote For 
the rest of the cou -retry 
4 8 12 16 




applies in seams lying at high inclinations 
where movement up or down the face may involve 
clambering from prop to prop rather than 
walking or crawling. The influence of these 
factors cannot be assessed with the information 
at present collected in accident statistics. 
Faulted ground will generally involve the 
firing of shots in the solid rock above or below 
the coal seam, and these shots included with 
ripping shots in 'other locations' were shown 
in Chapter IV to have a high potential risk. 
The combination of all these factors may provide 
a partial explanation for the high accident 
rate in Scotland, but it is difficult to see 
how the large differences between the observed 
numbers and calculated expectations of accidents 
could be due solely to these causes. 
Again thin seams require the removal of 
more strata from above or below the coal for the 
formation of roads of any given size and thus 
the firing of correspondingly more ripping shots 
than do thick seams. As shown in Chapter IV, 
pages 84 - 87, these shots have a higher 
'accident potential' than shots in coal or stone 
mines, and it was thought that the higher 
percentage of ripping shots fired in Scotland 
might account for at least part of the difference 
between observed and calculated values. 
Accordingly, Table XXVIII was prepared showing 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































available, the distribution of shots and 
accidents and the corresponding accident rate 
for the three locations, 'coal', 'stone mines' 
and 'other locations'. The percentage 
distribution of shots is also shown for the rest 
of the country, and expectations for accident 
figures for Scotland worked out, using the 
accident rates calculated for Scotland and the 
distribution of shots for the rest of the 
country. It is seen that the overall 
difference between the observed number of 
accidents and the calculated expectation is 
very slight, the anticipated drop in accidents 
from ripping shots being almost balanced by a 
similar increase from coal shots. 
The most obvious difference in shotfiring 
practice in Scotland, compared with the rest of 
Britain, is the continued use of considerable 
quantities of non- permitted explosive in 
conjunction with capped fuses at naked light 
collieries. Anyone firing shots where permitted 
explosives only may be used, must have the 
qualifications prescribed in Articles 4 and 5 of 
the Coal Mines (Explosives) Regulations, 1956, 
and these include, inter alia, a Certificate 
of Competency, a Shotfirer's Certificate granted 
on examination, or a Service Certificate. 
However, in naked light mines, a man may be 
appointed to be a shotfirer if he has certain 
practical mining experience and has attained the 
age/ 
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age of 22 years, or 21 years and possesses a 
General Certificate in Mining or higher 
qualification. It might logically be expected 
that the employment of such unqualified men 
would lead to the occurrence of excessive 
numbers of shotfiring accidents. 
In practice, it has been demonstrated both 
by the Royal Commission on Accidents in Mines 
(i) and by the Shotfiring and Its Alternatives 
Committee of the Institution of Mining Engineers 
(ii) that there is no substance in this 
argument. This result may be construed in two 
ways, and taken to indicate that fuse firing is 
no more dangerous than electric firing or that 
too much emphasis has been placed on the need 
for intensive training of shotfirers. It was 
shown on pages 54 - 56 of Chapter IV that the 
very high accident rate, which led to the 
formation of the committee of enquiry into the 
precautions necessary to secure safety in the use 
of explosives in coal mines, had begun to fall 
before the resultant legislation could be 
enacted and enforced. Unfortunately, this 
improvement has not been maintained and the most 
recent report of the Chief Inspector of Mines 
and Quarries reveals that a total of 294 people 
were killed and injured in shotfiring accidents 
in coal mines in 1958, an increase of 45 over 
the figure for 1957. It would thus appear that 
the amount of attention given to the training of 
shotfirers/ 
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shotfirers is not yielding the expected benefits 
of accident reduction. 
Having dealt with these factors without 
finding any reason for the high accident rate 
in Scotland, recourse must be made to less 
concrete but nevertheless possibly real 
explanations. The standard of practice 
achieved in the care in the use and handling of 
explosives offers a ready means of solution, 
as this could possibly override any or all other 
factors. The influence of this is very 
difficult to assess, as any visits to collieries 
by independent observers must be made with the 
approval and assistance of the National Coal 
Board and the purpose of the visit must, of 
course, be disclosed. Thus any section visited 
will be forewarned. In addition the observer 
will normally be accompanied by a senior 
official of the colliery, such as the Safety 
Officer, and the men will probably pay more 
attention to detail under this additional 
supervision than would normally be the case. 
To obtain worthwhile opinions, a very considerable 
period would have to be spent in several sections 
in each Division and this is not possible or 
practicable in a comparatively short period of 
study. 
Again if any attempt is made to rely on the 
opinion of mining engineers with long and varied 
experience/ 
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experience in different Areas or Divisions, 
another difficulty arises. Any person whose 
opinion might be expected to be valuable will 
normally have risen to hold a responsible post 
in the National Coal Board or the Mines 
Inspectorate and is thus no longer a private 
individual free to empress opinions which may 
be quoted against him at some later date. In 
the author's experience such men either give 
opinions, later found by personal experience to 
have been wildly overrated, on the standard of 
practice achieved in their Area or Division, with 
permission to quote, or a more realistic 
appraisal with strict injunctions that the 
comments are not for publication. It must 
regrettably be concluded, therefore, that 
opinions on the standard of practice achieved 
would have to be gained personally in each 
Division and this would take an impracticable 
length of time. It is in fact doubtful if 
permission for such long visits, with the stated 
intention of obtaining a measure of the care 
employed in the use and handling of explosives, 
would be granted. 
In the more restricted field of attempting 
to explain the high accident rate in Scotland, 
more positive opinions can be expressed. In 
the course of these investigations, and other 
visits unconcerned with shotfiring, a total of 
six weeks were spent in the East Midlands 
Division/ 
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Division, and approximately nine months in 
Scottish pits. Nothing was seen which could 
suggest that the standard of practice in 
shotfiring was lower in the Scottish Division 
than in the East Midlands and there was no 
reason to suppose that the high accident rate in 
Scotland was due to this factor. The impression 
was gained, however, that the shotfirer did not 
command the same degree of respect in Scotland. 
While this is unlikely to have any immediate 
effects, it must be remembered that shotfiring 
accidents occur very infrequently, and individual 
local factors need operate only very occasionally 
to result in accident rate variations. 
It has been suggested, that the Scot, 
notoriously difficult to discipline and always 
ready to take a chance, might be more prone to 
accidents on this account. Certainly these 
characteristics, desirable in certain circumstances, 
are very much out of place in shotfiring 
operations. It is difficult to see why this 
should apply only to shotfiring as Wynn (iii) 
showed that the Scottish Division was 
significantly better than the rest of the 
country in accidents from falls of ground at the 
face. Approximately the same people are 
involved and why shotfiring should be characterised 
by foolhardiness, and roof control by higher than 
average standards of care is difficult to 
understand. Some explanation of this may be 
found/ 
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found in the following figures, abstracted from 
the 1958 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector 
of Mines and Q.uarries, illustrating the order of 
the difference between the risks incurred from 
shotfiring operations and falls of ground at the 
face: 
Falls of ground 
at the face 
Shotfiring 





In these figures 'seriously injured' refers to 
those people whose injuries would be reportable 
to the Mine Inspectorate by reason of their 
severity, rather than the nature of their 
occurrence. 
Conclusions 
1. It is seen from the accident figures 
recorded for the North Eastern Division, and the 
Central East Area of the Scottish Division, that 
off -shift firing confirms its obvious theoretical 
advantages with practical reductions in the 
shotfiring accident rate. 
2. The provision of portable shelters does not 
result in any reduction in accidents. 
3. It has not been found possible to draw any 
positive conclusions for the high accident rate 
in Scotland, and certain factors which might be 
expected to raise the incidence of accidents are 
shown to have a small or negligible effect. It 
is/ 
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is suggested that the combination of difficult 
geological conditions, and a national temperament 
notoriously resistant to discipline may result 
in the high figures shown. 
(i) 
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
1. Although the hazard involved in the use and 
handling of explosives, expressed as persons 
killed or injured per million shots fired, is 
not high, the large number of shots fired 
annually results in a comparatively large number 
of accidents. 
2. Shotfiring accidents may be divided into 
two main categories - those due to some failure 
of the explosive or ancillary equipment to 
attain perfection and those due to failure of the 
human element. Continued research and develop - 
:ment in explosives technology have resulted in 
a reduction in the former class but the latter 
type forms a large and increasing percentage 
of the annual total of accidents. 
3. The statistical techniques developed by 
Wynn and used in this work provide a valuable 
means of representing graphically the significance 
of any differences existing between calculated 
1 expectations and observed numbers of accidents. 
L1. Only two National Coal Board Divisions 
showed significant differences in accident rates 
from the rest of the country over the period for 
which figures were available. The Scottish 
Division was very much worse, and the North 
Eastern Division very much better than the average 
for the rest of the country. 
On the limited amount of information 




other than coal seams or stone mines present a 
hazard greater than would be expected from the 
relative numbers fired in these situations. 
5. Over half the annual total of shots fired 
in National Coal Board collieries are in coal, 
initiated by electric detonators and fired 
singly, and this class is still by far the most 
important in British coal mining practice. 
Simultaneous and delay firing offer potential 
safety as well as operational advantages, but no 
measure of these can be obtained with the 
limited information at present available. 
6. Alternatives to explosives offer safety 
advantages over conventional explosives and 
should give corresponding benefits in a 
reduction in accidents. 
7. Pulsed infusion shotfiring, in the 
comparatively limited circumstances in which it 
may be usefully employed, yields safety, 
operational and economic advantages over 
conventional shotfiring. 
8. Limited evidence suggests that the use of 
water ampoules in conjunction with conventional 
explosives gives consistent reductions in the 
dust produced by shotfiring in rippings but 
widely variable figures have been recorded in 
the dust counts before and after the introduction 
of these devices in coal blasting operations. 
9./ 
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9. Off -shift firing offers great potential 
advantages in comparison with conventional 
practice, and these are confirmed by the low 
accident rate in the North Eastern Division and 
the Central East Area of the Scottish Division. 
10. The general standard of practice achieved 
in shotfiring is very much below the minimum 
required by law and demonstrated to the shotfirer 
in the training period. This is due to a 
combination of lack of effective supervision 
and the needs of production clashing with safety 
requirements. 
11. In orthodox hand- filled longwall working 
when the coal preparation shots are fired on the 
production shift, the nature of the shotfirers 
work, with periods of great activity alternating 
with periods of comparative idleness, leads to 
carelessness and skimped precautions. 
12. In orthodox longwall working, very limited 
shelter is available on the coal face, and it is 
frequently necessary to rely on cover which 
cannot possibly be considered satisfactory. 
13. It is seen from the accident positions of 
the North Eastern, North Western and East Midlands 
Divisions that the provision of portable shelters 




14. Although no satisfactory concrete explanati 
for the high shotfiring accident rate in the 
Scottish Division could be found, it is 
suggested that a combination of difficult 
natural conditions, making men more reluctant to 
retreat a sufficient distance from the shots 
and a national temperament not amenable to 
discipline might explain the difference between 
Scotland and the rest of the country. 
Recommendations 
1. All shotfiring accident reports should 
include the location and method of initiation of 
the shot causing the accident. When sufficient 
information has been collected, the relative 
hazards involved in the firing of shots by 
different methods in different locations could 
be accurately assessed,and any changes in 
practice, indicated by the results to be 
desirable, could be effected. 
n 
2. Whenever possible shots should be fired when 
the least possible number of men are exposed to 
the risk of flying debris. When the introduction 
of off -shift firing would create roof control 
difficulties it might be possible to fire a 
limited number of shots on the preparation shift 
and the remainder on the production shift. 
3. As there is no indication that the provision 
of shelters in gate roads results in a reduction 
in/ 
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in shotfiring accidents, emphasis should be 
placed on the necessity for making and using the 
solid cover provided by manholes. These should 
be made even if not required by law. 
If care were taken in these steps, accidents 
from shots in rippings and stone mines could be 
virtually eliminated. 
¿4. As little shelter exists on a longwall face, 
it is difficult to see how accidents resulting 
from coal preparation shots will ever be completely 
eliminated. However, reductions might be 
effected in two ways: 
(a) At pit level, attempts should be made to 
arrange the method of work in the sections to 
reduce the need for high speed, and correspondingl 
reduced care, in shotfiring operations. 
(b) Although material may be projected from 
any shot, the possibility is increased should 
the shothole be badly placed, overcharged or 
understemmed, and these are all factors 
militating against the economic, as well as safety 
needs of shotfiring. As experience has shown 
that the improved results following an increased 
supervision tend to be lost when the supervision 
is removed, it is suggested that the appointment 
of a specialist oversman to supervise blasting 
practice would reduce these malpractices, and 
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